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Abstract 
This thesis argues that poverty alleviation strategies and programs carried out by the 
government and Non Governmental Organizations in Ghana provide affirmative 
solutions to poverty. This is because, these intervention strategies have been influenced 
by conventional discourses on poverty that fail to adequately address non-economic 
issues of poverty such as powerlessness, marginalization and under-representation. The 
study is carried out in a two-pronged manner; first, it analyses state policies and 
strategies, particularly the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), on poverty 
alleviation and compares these to NGO programs, implemented with funds and support 
from external donor organizations. Specifically, I focus on how NGOs and the 
government of Ghana negotiate autonomy and financial dependency with their funding 
donor-partners and how these affect their policies and programs. Findings from this study 
reveal that while external influences dominate poverty alleviation policies and strategies, 
NGOs and the government of Ghana exercise varying degrees of agency in navigating 
these issues. In particular, NGOs have been able to adapt their programs to the changing 
needs of donor markets, and are also actively engaged in re-orienting poverty back to the 
political domain through advocacy campaigns. Overall, rural communities in Ghana 
depend on charitable NGOs for the provision of essential social services, while the 
Ghanaian government depends on international donor assistance for its development 
projects. 
VI 
Introduction 
The phenomenon of poverty in most developing countries is characterized by both 
economic and non-economic issues. While empirical economic crises remain the most 
obvious manifestation of poverty in many of these countries, non-economic factors 
appear to have more damaging effects on people especially since these are rarely seen, 
much less discussed. In this thesis, I examine the importance of recognizing and 
incorporating these non-econonuc issues into state and Non Governmental 
Organizations' poverty alleviation programs and strategies in Ghana. 
Ghana was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain political independence 
from British colonial rule in 1957. As defined by the joint International Monetary Fund 
/World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC), Ghana is a heavily 
indebted developing country with the majority of Ghanaians, 70% of the population, 
living in rural areas. These rural communities, according to the National Development 
Planning Commission (NDPC) of Ghana, are impoverished. As in other developing 
countries, several poverty alleviation or reduction initiatives, mainly donor-funded, have 
been implemented by both state and non-state institutions in Ghana. From 19831 to the 
present, the government of Ghana has adopted several poverty alleviation/reduction 
strategies to combat poverty. The most recent was the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(GPRS), financed mainly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank under 
the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative (HIPC). 
While state poverty alleviation initiatives have tended to focus on macro-
economic policies, Non Governmental Organizations' (NGO) programs have until 
I I am using this timeline because that is the period that Ghana implemented IMFlWorld Bank sponsored 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). I have discussed SAPs in detail in this thesis. 
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recently been geared towards the provision of basic social services to the rural poor. The 
involvement of Non Governmental Organizations in poverty alleviation in Ghana, 
particularly as social safety nets for poor and marginalized rural folk, intensified during 
the 1980s, following the high social costs of the very unpopular Economic Recovery 
Program (ERP) otherwise known as the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP).2 These 
economic recovery programs were introduced to developing countries in the 1980s by the 
Bretton-Woods institutions. These programs contained "a package of aid finance from the 
World Bank and other Multilateral and bilateral donors, and a package of economic 
reforms, introduction of which is specified as a condition for the release of aid" (Elson, 
1995, p. 1851). 
These programs and strategies seem to reflect the interests of the donors more 
than the interests of beneficiaries (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; Interview data). The 
government and NGOs operating in Ghana appear then to be "service delivery 
mechanisms for predetermined development agendas" (Mohan, 2005, p. 69). While it is 
undisputable that external influences in policies affect state and NGO programs and 
strategies for poverty alleviation, these 'service delivery vehicles' (the Ghanaian 
government and NGOs), do not act without agency or control over their policies and 
programs. In the case of the government, its agency, while present, is limited in terms of 
negotiating the focus of loan agreements and conditions from International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), especially the Bretton-Woods institutions (World Bank and IMP). The 
government can choose to accept or reject these policies and loans altogether. Its 
2 Aimed at reducing the incidence of poverty, SAPs were economic recovery programs from the IMF which 
were adopted by many developing countries. SAPs emphasized the diminished role of the state in the 
provision of social services and encouraged market operations in the provision of these services (Elson, 
1995) . 
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acceptance of terms and conditions associated with loans is therefore an indication of its 
willingness to accept any issues of control or lack of recognition such assistance may 
come with. On the other hand, NGOs are aware of the limitations of their programs and 
some of them are making frantic efforts to persuade the state to take over projects that 
they have started and cannot continue because of financial constraints. 
Although income-based measurements of poverty reveal some improvement in 
the poverty levels in Ghana, there is still pervasive poverty in the country, with the rural 
poor being the worst affected (NDPC, 2005). At the macro level, economic instability 
and inflation have become household terms. This has ensued in continued state 
indebtedness and dependency on foreign aid, perhaps resulting in inability to provide 
basic social services to people at the micro level. NGOs respond by filling this gap and 
providing social capital to rural communities. Social capital "refers to the norms and 
networks that enable people to act collectively" (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000, p.226).3 
Despite these efforts, the various strategies adopted by the state and NGOs appear to be 
focused on economic redistribution that have been influenced by an economic conception 
of poverty. As a result of the narrow focus of these strategies, poverty has not been 
holistically tackled. 
My thesis argues that these initiatives and programs should emphasize both 
redistribution and recognition. I further argue that, by not addressing redistribution and 
recognition in tandem, these strategies and programs provide affirmative rather than 
3 Through out my thesis, I refer to the idea of social capital in various ways. In particular, I refer to 
principles of social capital in the relationship NGOs have with their beneficiary communities. In this case, 
NGOs constitute formal social capital to people in rural communities because of their ability to lend 
support to communities in hard times. For a detailed discussion on social capital and development, please 
see, Woolcock and Narayan, (2000). Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, Research, and 
Policy. In The World Bank Research Observer. 15 (2), pp. 225-49; Evans, P. (1996). Government Action, 
Social Capital and Development: Reviewing the evidence on Synergy. In World Development, 24 (6). 
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transformative solutions to poverty in Ghana. Transformative solutions incorporate both 
recognition and redistribution in their design and implementation (Fraser, 1995). 
However, affirmative solutions are temporary remedies for a social injustice issue that 
fail to transform the underlying generative framework that may contribute to the injustice 
being tackled (Ibid). 
From my initial examination of literature on poverty alleviation in Ghana, it is 
clear that poverty alleviation has been carried out affirmatively by both the government 
and NGOs working in the country. It is important to note that even though some of these 
programs are affirmative, they contain elements for transformative solutions. Others with 
some modifications have the potential of generating transformative solutions. The various 
programs do not adequately address systemic4 problems of poverty that relate to Ghana's 
position in the global political economy. 
Without addressing systemic issues relating to Ghana's poverty in the 
international political economy, current poverty alleviation programs in Ghana are 
encouraging, sustaining or strengthening a situation of dependency, which already 
exists.5 Dependency in this case is a multi- tier problem. The state is largely dependent on 
IFIs and bilateral aid institutions from developed countries such as the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) for sources of funding, while rural 
4 Systemic/structural issues used in this thesis refers to relations and interrelations in the global order that 
detennine decision making processes and how power is vested in institutions and nations. 
5 The dependency theory has been influential in many debates on development in Africa and Latin 
America. Perhaps, this theory, outdated as it may be, is still relevant to debates on critical development 
theory because it addresses certain core issues at the heart of development aid and policies. It has been 
modified to be applicable to present development discourses on Africa and Latin America. For an extensive 
discussion of this theory, see Blomstrom and Hettne (1984); and Bauzon, (1992). 
However, the use of this tenn here denotes a situation where Ghana relies on aid for development in a 
variety of ways. Dependency is then sustained by a constant renewal of 'contracts' for and from 
development agencies to continue to carry out various development projects with or without modification. I 
also use the tenn here to imply a situation where the country depends literally on external aid in the fonn of 
loans and donations for poverty alleviation. 
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communities tend to depend on NGOs for the provision of essential social services such 
as water, primary health care and education. NGOs in turn rely on charitable sources of 
funding for their programs. This thesis argues that such strong NGO involvement in 
poverty alleviation, while depoliticizing poverty, also masks the failure of state policies 
and strategies to meet basic subsistence needs of its citizens. Even though their programs 
de-politicize poverty to an extent, NGOs are, through advocacy campaigns, also re-
orienting poverty back to the domain of politics. This ability of NGOs to provide where 
the state has failed is interpreted as partnership between the state and civil society for the 
development of the country. These not withstanding, NGOs are not merely good 
Samaritans for the poor. While poverty alleviation remains the raison d'etre for their 
existence, many of these organizations are unwilling to invest their own money into their 
programs. They rely on, and use funds from their donor partners for their development 
projects, claiming that monies generated from their private consultancy work remain 
private profit used for organizational capacity building (ProNet-North, September 2006). 
I contend that the most transformative solution to this crucial human rights issue 
is not only a political one, but one that emphasizes both redistribution and recognition at 
the local and international levels. This study approaches the topic in a two-pronged 
manner; first, it analyses state policies and strategies, particularly the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS), on poverty alleviation and compares these to NGO 
programs, implemented with funds and support from external donors. 
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Conceptual Definitions and Issues 
First, I approach the topic of poverty6 as a human rights and therefore social 
justice issue. While it is not the intention of this thesis to take a particular side in the on-
going debates on the topic, I critique a purely economic conception of poverty as too 
narrow. This should not be interpreted to mean that the economic aspects of poverty are 
not important in tackling it. In fact, redistribution of economic/material resources is 
crucial to any attempts at alleviating it. This critique seeks to draw attention to non-
economic issues of poverty and advocate that both be seen as equally important in the 
'fight against poverty'. Discussions of some of the contentious issues of poverty are taken 
up in chapter two of this thesis. In the discussions that follow, poverty is used generally 
to refer to the situation where a country, individual or community lacks various economic 
and non-economic resources. More specifically, my working definition is that poverty 
encompasses both conditions of want for economic redistribution and cultural 
recognition; a state of being, embodying social exclusion, marginalization and 
powerlessness (to control the means of economic redistribution and production) as a 
result of lacking economic or material resources. 
Consequently, poverty alleviation and poverty reduction, while theoretically 
distinct, are practically similar and used interchangeably in this study. This in part stems 
from their interchangeable use by research participants and in primary documents relating 
to poverty in Ghana. Ideally, poverty should be eradicated in Ghana and other parts of the 
6 Writing on this topic presented various ambiguities and challenges that were sometimes overwhelming to 
me as a young researcher. The discourse on poverty is voluminous. It is also very contentious. While this 
project has benefited from some of the broad general discussions on the topic of poverty itself, it has had to, 
as a matter of necessity, limit the scope of discussion to issues related to the theme of the study. Obviously, 
this study is an on-going dialogue and remains open to discussions on the vast expanse of literature on 
poverty, especially aspects not adequately tackled in its discussions. 
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world; however, given that poverty can be defined in relative terms, it is inevitable that 
some people and nations are always going to be poor relative to others. However, people 
who are poor should not be denied certain rights, especially as they relate to basic human 
sustenance and political representation. It is only when these basic needs are met, and 
institutional changes made, locally and globally, that attempts can be made at totally 
eradicating poverty. My starting point is that this has not yet even been done, hence my 
argument for sustainable poverty alleviation. 
Redistribution, as used here, refers to the allocation/provision of material 
resources, or activities that provide economic relief to poor communities and countries. 
The use of recognition, as employed by Fraser (1995), is used broadly to encompass 
issues of participation in decision-making and respect for the views and autonomy of 
poor developing countries and communities. Generally, this encompasses non-material 
components of poverty, including power, representation and voice as well as systemic 
issues. Together, these two broad aspects of poverty need to be tackled in tandem to 
provide a transformative solution to poverty. The use of these terms here has been 
simplified just for the purposes of the study. 
Existing programs which tend to privilege economlC redistribution over 
recognition only provide affirmative solutions to poverty. 'Affirmative solution', is 
borrowed from the works of Fraser (1995) and refers to the situation where solutions 
proposed for solving a problem fail to tackle underlying structural causes, but only deal 
with the situation in its present state. In other words, whatever is being done to solve a 
problem works within the same structural system which in fact, may be the cause of the 
problem. In this study, affirmative solutions for poverty in Ghana refer to programs that 
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ignore structural issues, especially as they relate to Ghana's position of dependency in the 
global political economy. Ghana, as a state, is relatively powerless and marginalized in 
the international political economy. In other words, its representation in major world 
institutions at the helm of economic and political affairs is weakened by its economic 
poverty. If the international system is restructured in a way that is conducive to 
propelling growth and empowering developing nations, then it is assumed that programs 
will easily be planned, implemented and sustained autonomously by developing countries 
such as Ghana. Conversely, transformative solutions, is used here to refer to the situation 
where systemic issues related to a problem are adequately dealt with. In other words, 
such solutions incorporate recognition and redistribution. For example in my study, the 
argument is made that the structures of IFIs make it difficult for developing countries to 
act independently, and allow internal democratic institutions to operate independently. 
Therefore, if these deficiencies in these institutions are addressed, then the situation will 
improve and the dependency cycle will be broken. 
Neo-liberal economic policies emphasize market forces as crucial to economic growth and 
individual wellbeing. This approach "sees the individual, rather than the market, as blameworthy for 
poverty and unemployment" (Bezanson, 2006, p. 4). Neo-liberalism is used in this thesis generally to refer 
to the emphasis on macro-economic growth as the engine of growth and development for Ghanaians. This 
approach is evident in government's economic policies constantly referring to the private sector as the 
'engine of growth' and predicating poverty alleviation/reduction on macro-economic growth (see 
discussion of the GPRS and budget statement of Ghana discussed in detail in Chapter Three of this thesis). 
Central Research Questions 
Why has the unbearable incidence of poverty persisted despite various programs, 
policies, strategies and efforts by state and NGOs to reduce/alleviate it in Ghana? Has the 
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economIC conception of poverty limited strategies to the domain of economIC 
approaches? By and large, poverty as a case of injustice requires both redistribution and 
recognition if transformative solutions are to be found (Fraser, 1995) for it. Affirmative 
solutions condone unjust socio-political economic systems at local and international 
levels. 
Methodology 
To adequately address the central research questions, a combination of qualitative 
techniques were used for the study. This eclectic method consisted of interviews, some 
critical discourse analysis, and documentary research. Primary sources of data included 
in-depth telephone interviews with executive and program officers ofNGOs and personal 
communications. Various government and institutional policy documents, including the 
Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2006 budget statement of Ghana, NDPC7 
reports, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country initiative policy, annual reports and fact 
sheets from the IMF and WB, and UNDP reports were examined. 
I started by analyzing various policy documents on poverty in Ghana. This was 
done simultaneously with literature reviews. From my initial analyses, I realized that I 
really could not discuss poverty alleviation in Ghana without analyzing policies of the 
IMF and WB because they are Ghana's main development partners. The analyses of 
Government of Ghana policies or strategies could not be done independently of IMF IWB 
policy documents. At this point, I decided to conduct an interview with a finance minister 
of Ghana to get the views of the government on its strategies and to find out how much 
7 The NDPC is a constitutionally established body in Ghana with a mandate to advise the president of 
Ghana on development planning and strategy. Among other things, this body "undertakes studies and 
makes recommendations on development and socio-economic issues" (NDPC website, no page number). 
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ownership the government had over its poverty alleviation policies. However, after 
several ~tile attempts to interview the minister, I gave up on getting an interview and 
relied mainly on documents for the analyses. Compared to the interview data from 
NGOs, the documentary reports provided scanty information on the topic. They lack 
depth and do not really tell the whole story. After identifying some key themes and 
reading up on the activities of some NGOs, it was clear that there were substantial 
differences and similarities in Government and NGO strategies in terms of approach. 
However, it was not clear whether or not NGO programs were potentially more 
transformative than state programs. Armed with this knowledge, I designed the interview 
guide for NGOs. 
A total of five NGOs were reviewed for this study, and five officials of these 
NGOs were interviewed. Of the five interviewees, there were four were male participants 
and only one female participant. Interestingly, all four male interviewees were officials of 
the four local NGOs reviewed for the study while the only female was an official of an 
international NGO. Of this total number, three were executive officers. The remaining 
two were program officers. Interviews were conducted between August and November of 
2006 and lasted between one to two hours. 
The NGOs that participated in the study are: Village Aid, a UK based NGO which 
operates via local partners in developing countries; Simli Aid, a local Ghanaian NGO 
which receives funding from Village Aid; ProNet-North, also a local Ghanaian NGO 
which primarily works in the water sector, providing water to rural communities in 
Ghana and receives funding from various external sources; ISODEC- a rights based NGO 
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mainly working in social policy advocacy; and finally. SL 8 which also receives funding 
from external sources and works in various places in the country. I also had personal 
communication with an official of the NDPC. Four of these NGOs concentrate their 
activities on rural areas in Ghana mainly because these are the endemic poverty stricken 
areas in the country. It is important to note that the northern sector of Ghana has been my 
main reference point for the study because of its state of poverty.9 Three of the ten 
regions in the northern sector of Ghana have the highest poverty levels in the country 
according to NDPC reports. This sector of the country in a way mirrors the country's 
own position as a Heavily Indebted Poor Country. It lacks visible infrastructure, adequate 
basic social amenities such as water, electricity, and health care facilities. 
The only criterion for selecting participating NGOs was their involvement in 
poverty alleviation/reduction in Ghana. Preliminary research on these NGOs was done 
mainly via internet. Before contacting these NGOs for interviews, some background 
reading on their programs and policies was done on their official websites. Following 
this, introductory emails were sent, introducing the research topic and requesting 
permission for interviews. Although about twelve different NGOs were contacted 
through email, only two responses from e-mails were received. It became necessary to 
follow up with phone calls. After telephone contact was made, I requested personal email 
addresses of executive and program officers to which my official statement of purpose as 
well as consent form was sent. This was to ensure confidentiality in communication. The 
8 This is a pseudonym used for an NGO. In the interview, the interviewee requested that this be done. 
9 I am familiar with the Upper West Region, one of the three most impoverished regions in Ghana, because 
I not only grew up in this region, I have carried out several advocacy/awareness campaigns on various 
issues in secondary schools in this region. I had the opportunity of traveling to, and interviewing fanners in, 
rural areas in this region as a research assistant for the University of Ghana's Institute for Statistical, Social 
and Economic research. This was in July 2005. 
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interview guide was also sent to interviewees as required by the ethics board. Besides, 
interviewees wanted a sense of the questions I would be asking. It is possible that 
interviewees gave me socially desirable responses given that I am a student of Social 
Justice and Equity Studies. However, given that the interviews were lengthy with various 
follow-up questions, I am sure this issue was adequately dealt with. Since the interview 
guide was semi-structured and allowed for a lot of interaction between interviewer and 
interviewees, follow up questions were easily asked. I also paid attention to exploring 
activities ofNGOs in general. 
Participants for the study were executive directors and program officers of their 
organizations. I chose this category of people because of their various positions and 
experiences in their organizations. Their views on the topic are important since they are 
in charge of planning poverty alleviation programs. They also approve programs planned 
by their staff. In cases where NGOs only implement broad policy guidelines from 
funding partners, people holding such positions have the power to determine what 
actually gets done on the ground. Many of these executive officers are also founders of 
their NGOs and as such their ideas and visions drive their organizations. Ultimately, 
people in such positions of power, determine in one way or another, what services are 
provided to communities. They therefore exert enormous influence on their beneficiary 
communities. For instance, ProNet-North shifted the focus of their programs from direct 
provision of social services to advocacy, because funding for social service programs was 
running out. Such decisions ultimately affect the lives of people in communities they 
operate in. In this case, a decision to change their outlook on poverty or the way to tackle 
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it raises important issues for consideration. Are their definitions of poverty holistic 
enough? And finally, do their programs adequately address systemic issues of poverty? 
Even though the interview guide was structured to solicit information on the 
nature of programs carried out by NGOs, it became difficult to decipher between what 
was personal opinion and organizational view. This became obvious when during 
interviews some participants used the phrase 'I think ... ' However, these opinions are 
sometimes the 'law' in these NGOs because of the power vested in their executive 
directors. It is worth mentioning that there was a noticeable difference in the amount and 
kind of information disclosed by participants in relation to their position within the 
organization. While the executive directors had no problems disclosing information on all 
aspects of their operations and engaging in 'frank talk' with me, one of the project 
officers I interviewed was quite careful with the kind and amount of information he 
shared with me. On several occasions, he referred me to their website. For instance, 
when I asked about the source of funding for their NGO, he asked why I was interested in 
that kind of information. He was of the opinion that that kind of information was not very 
relevant to their operations. Here, he asked me to look it up on their website. While all 
executive directors interviewed had no problem with me disclosing the source of 
information from them, this was not the case for this program officer. He was hesitant to 
be quoted or cited on the record. The second program officer requested a transcript of the 
interview to ensure that he would not be misquoted. This clearly reflects internal power 
dynamics at play within these NGOs. 
Furthermore, I had to give a more extensive introduction of myself to the program 
officer who was initially very skeptical of what I actually wanted to do with the 
13 
information. This person requested my CV; family ties in Ghana and even a picture. 
Given that I was not gathering personal information from them, I wondered why all this 
was necessary. However, I provided all the information with the exception of the 
photograph and finally got the interview! The executive directors on the other hand, were 
satisfied with the information I provided in the introductory letters. They however also 
quizzed me on my nationality and personal experiences with poverty and some of their 
programs. Even though I am not familiar with the internal climate and structures of 
NGOs, reflecting on my interview experiences, it is obvious that because NGOs mainly 
have a small staff, they could easily become paternalistic with the executive director 
being in charge of everything, sometimes including being the founder of the organization. 
Furthermore, financial information is not easily disclosed. Interviewees were careful 
about how much of that information was disclosed, with one participant declining to 
speak on the issue of funding at all. Recently, NGOs in Ghana have come under a lot of 
criticism from the government and media as organizations that are feeding off the name 
of the poor, and becoming local elites. lO 
Because I interviewed executive directors or people in policy making positions of 
NGOs, it may appear that this study adopted a top-down approach to the subject of 
poverty. This is not the case. While it would have been beneficial to interview actual 
beneficiaries of poverty alleviation programs to find out their views and opinions ofNGO 
activities, it was not feasible to do so because of distance and the limitations of 
communication. Telephone interviews were not possible since many poor people have no 
access to telephones, especially in rural areas. To compensate for this, I analyzed 
10 For example, see a BBC news report on the threat to blacklist some NGOs in Ghana because of their 
inability to render accounts of donor-funding. http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhi/africal3517827.stm 
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information gathered in a large scale study in rural communities in Ghana by Narayan 
(2000) where people were asked to define poverty and discuss access to resources from 
various sources including government and NGO. 
The second major strategy was the examination of the GPRSP, the 2005 Budget 
statement of Ghana, Ghana's letter of intent to the IMF for joining HIPC and the HIPC 
initiative itself. I found country information on Ghana from the IMF and World Bank 
websites, as well as the government of Ghana websites. Here, I sought information on 
how such policies, with the support of the IMF and World Bank, influenced the nature of 
the strategy for poverty alleviation by the government. The letter of intent from the 
government of Ghana to the IMF to join the HIPC initiative officially indicates a 
willingness of the state to go along with conditions spelled out in the initiative. If the 
government consents to the conditions and policies of HIPC, is it because they have no 
other choices or because they see these programs compatible with their own development 
agendas? Is the government resorting to the language of the IFIs to negotiate loans 
because that is the only way to find funding for development programs? Most 
importantly, I wanted to find out if these programs allowed the government to cater to the 
needs of the very poor in rural areas. The personal communications I had with an officer 
of the NDPC provided some insight on government policies in this regard. I used these as 
primary sources of data. I could not directly quote him on such information because it is 
not part of his job description to grant such interviews. 
Analyses of these programs and initiatives were based on critical discourse 
analyses (CDA). CDA is rooted in feminist-post-modern thought. It seeks as a general 
objective to question certain normally taken for granted assumptions especially 
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concerning power relations (Carroll, 2004). In this thesis, I looked at how the relationship 
between Ghana and the IMF /WB, through loan programs, is embedded in power relations 
just as the situation is between NGOs and communities they work in. Since IFIs and 
NGOs provide financial resources to aid community and national development, they 
possess and exercise power and control over their beneficiaries. Overall, for analyses of 
both interview data and documents I paid attention to whether or not these programs 
addressed both recognition and redistribution equally. 
Organization of Thesis 
Following this introduction which outlines my research problem and methodology, the 
rest of the thesis is organized into four chapters, as follows. 
Chapter One: The Search for a Transformative Solution provides a discussion of 
Ghana's socio-political and economic situation and the influence of the IMF and World 
Bank in policy making on poverty alleviation in the country. It discusses the context 
within which the IMF, World Bank and NGOs have become so involved in poverty 
alleviation and development in Ghana, as well as the formal and informal political 
structures of the country. This section also provides some statistics on key poverty 
indicators in the country. This provides a general background to later discussions of 
government's agency in negotiating poverty alleviation policies. In this and other 
chapters where the IMF and World Bank are discussed, I analyze information from 
official websites of these institutions which I consider as primary data. 
In Chapter Two, a discussion of the literature on poverty alleviation is provided, 
alongside the theoretical framework for the thesis. In this theoretical section, I engage 
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with the literature in the form of a dialogue, discussing key findings and providing 
examples on how my current study is, in dialogue with these theoretical issues. The 
discussions in this segment are taken up in themes that reflect the major premises for the 
study. This also generally sets the broader context of a discussion of the neo-liberal ll 
approach and discourses of the IFIs on poverty not only in Ghana, but in other places 
where they operate. 
Following this, Chapter Three: Conceptualizing Poverty in Ghana, focuses on the 
limitations of orthodox approaches to poverty in Ghana. This chapter also examines how 
non-material issues in poverty have been addressed, by examining the various initiatives 
and policies (mostly state policies) for poverty alleviation in Ghana. Have these programs 
been helpful to Ghanaians? How is the agency of the government compromised in these 
initiatives? Or how does government negotiate its agency? This discussion takes up 
issues raised in Chapter One in a more detailed discussion. Are the statistics on poverty in 
Ghana in Chapter One all that there is to poverty in Ghana? 
Finally, Chapter Four: NGO and State Programs: Similarities, Divergence, 
Convergences and Creative Tensions, provides analyses from the findings of the study. 
The analyses presented here focus on key thematic issues and findings from the study. It 
also contains a discussion on directions for future research. 
11 Neo-liberalism is used in this thesis generally to refer to the emphasis on macro-economic growth as the 
engine of growth and development for Ghanaians, and the reduction in state's direct expenditure on basic 
social services such as water, education and health care. This approach is evident in government's 
economic policies constantly referring to the private sector as the' engine of growth' and predicating 
poverty alleviation/reduction on macro-economic growth (see discussion of the GPRS and budget 
statement of Ghana discussed in detail in chapter three of this thesis). 
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Chapter One: The Search for a Transformative Solution 
Ghana: Socio-Political Context of Development 
Once referred to as the Gold Coast, Ghana's political independence from British 
Colonial rule in 1957 was a sign of hope and promise for the rest of Africa. Ghana's first 
president, the renowned Dr. K wame Nkrumah, clearly stated that ''the independence of 
Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up to the total liberation of Africa. ,,12 This 
promise was however short lived when Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup in 
1966. Up until now, it is still unclear to many ordinary Ghanaians how Ghana, with a 
thriving gold mining industry, became impoverished and heavily indebted soon after 
independence. One way to get around it, perhaps, is to blame it on political instability and 
financial misappropriation in periods of military coups following independence. 
Geographically, Ghana is located in West Africa, with a population estimate of 
twenty-two million, one hundred and thirteen thousand (22,113,000). Fifty-four (54%) 
percent of the population is rural.13 There are ten regions in the country, three in the 
northern savanna sector of the country and six in the southern, mainly rain-forest sector. 
Politically, each of the ten regions is headed by a minister appointed by the ruling 
government. In each region, governance is structurally decentralized. There is a regional 
coordinating council, district assembly, and a number of unit committees. These 
structures, ideally, provide for grass-root participation in governance and political 
decision-making. Democratic elections for the presidency and members of parliament are 
held every four years. The Parliament of Ghana comprises two hundred and thirty 
12 This is contained in Nkrumah's Independence Day speech he delivered on the eve of Ghana's 
independence-6th March 1957. It has become quite a common statement that is repeated even by pupils in 
elementary schools for school plays on the independence story among others. 
J3 WHO, Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance: 
http://www.who.intlcountryfocus/resources/ccsbrief ghana gha 06 en.pdf. Accessed on 3rd March 2007. 
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members who are elected at local constituency levels. Even though there have been a 
number of coups in the country since independence, many of these have not degenerated 
into civil wars. Ghana returned to full democratic rule in 1992 following elections that 
brought to power an erstwhile military ruler, FIt. Lt. J.J Rawlings. Four successful 
elections have been conducted since the 1992 elections and the mantle of government has 
successfully passed from one political party to another. A centre-right political party, the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP), has been in power since 2000. 
In terms of development and development planning for the country, the different 
political parties have proposed and implemented various strategies and policies. 
Development policy and planning have been heavily influenced by foreign aid with the 
largest donor/lender being the World Bank (Whitfield, 2005). Governments since 
independence have inherited debt from previous governments and have thus continued 
the relationships with donors, especially the Bretton-Woods institutions. It is estimated 
that even though Ghana's debt problems date back to the 1960s, the period of structural 
adjustments escalated the debt problem, and made it unsustainable (Tetteh, 2003). The 
widely condemned SAPs, while scoring points on the macro-economic sector in Ghana, 
failed to improve Ghana's general situation as a heavily indebted country, thereby 
compelling the government to spend more and more money servicing debt, reducing 
spending on social services and maintaining a donor-recipient relationship with multi-
lateral and bilateral donors (Whitfield, 2005; Osei and Quartey 2001). The WB and IMF, 
as well as other donors have actively played crucial roles in the policy formulation sector 
in Ghana. A more detailed discussion of the agency of the state vis-a-vis the Bank is 
taken up in the following section. 
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The main stay of the majority of Ghanaians is subsistence agriculture. Ghana 
exports a number of primary products. The main cash and export crop, cocoa, is grown in 
the southern sector of the country. Economically, the southern sector of the country is 
more developed than the northern sector. Generally, Ghana's GDP in US $ in 2003 was 
estimated to be 2,238 (UNDP Report, 2005), ranking 138 out of 177 in terms of its 
human development index (HDI) in the 2005 Human Development Report. Luxemburg's 
GDP in the same year was $62,298. The HDI sums up the country's physical situation as 
a poor country since it measures life expectancy, literacy and income. As indicated in the 
UNDP report, this measure is only a starting point. For instance, according to the report, 
life expectancy at birth is 56.8 but the quality ofthis life is not discussed. In Japan, which 
ranks first in this sector, it is 82.0 years. While the combined enrollment in primary, 
secondary and tertiary education in Ghana for 200212003 is 46%, the United Kingdom, 
which ranks first in this sector, records 123%. 
The healthcare system in Ghana has until very recently been inaccessible to the 
majority of people, particularly in rural areas, because it ran on the 'cash and carry' 
system (Biritum, 2001). This is a system where patients had to pay upfront for the full 
cost of drugs and medical treatment. Before the implementation of this system in 1992, 
the provision of health services in government hospitals was virtually free (ibid). 
Recently, the current New Patriotic Party (NPP) government initiated a national health 
insurance scheme. Since this is a new initiative, it is hoped that it will improve the health 
sector in the country. There is currently no data on how effective this system is in curbing 
health problems in the country. Generally, in terms of health, there is a dismal picture. 
For instance, only a total of seventy-five percent of the population is reported to be using 
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improved sources of drinking water, with eighteen percent using adequate sanitation 
facilities according to United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) report for 2004. 
Having provided a background of Ghana's socio-political and economic climate, 
the next section focuses on the politics of policy making in Ghana. It analyses the major 
players in national development planning. This section touches on issues of hegemony, 
power and dominance of the WB and IMF in their relationship with the government and 
how government negotiates and exercises agency in poverty alleviation policies. This 
section is important to the overall discussion of poverty alleviation because it provides 
insight into how Ghanaian governments have been tackling poverty through broad policy 
frameworks that have also created the environment for NGO activity in the country. 
IMF and WB Policies: Role and Influence on Poverty Alleviation in Ghana 
Despite the general admission of the failure of SAPs, Ghana and many other 
developing countries continue to solicit funds and development assistance from the 
Bretton-Woods institutions, thereby entrenching the dominance and role of these 
institutions in economic policy making in Ghana (Whitfield, 2005). 
The IMF, mainly a financial institution, among other things, promotes 
"international monetary cooperation and provides temporary financial assistance to 
countries to help ease balance of payments adjustment" (IMF Fact sheet, 2006, no page). 
The IMF concerns itself mainly with the macro-economic policies of member countries 
and "helps a number of countries make the transition from central planning to market-
oriented systems and enter the global market economy; and to promote growth and 
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poverty reduction in the poorest countries at risk of being left behind by globalization" 
(ibid). It is clear from this that the IMF is interested in a uniform neo-liberal global 
economic system. Interestingly, the IMF professes that global economic interdependence 
has called for integrated economies since "any country's prosperity depends more than 
ever both on the economic performance of other countries and on the existence of an 
open and stable global economic environment" (lMF Fact sheet, 2006, no page). Such a 
statement gives the impression that member countries interact on equal power scales 
irrespective of their fmancial circumstances. Perhaps, naively, it is expected that all 
member countries hold equal say in the affairs of the Fund. 
However, this is not the case. Major decisions of the fund are taken through a 
"weighted voting system: the larger a country's quota in the IMF, determined broadly by 
its economic size, the more votes it has" (ibid). Here, clearly, power is not only vested in 
countries with larger purses, the power of the purse is used as a controlling mechanism to 
ensure conformity to the Fund's neo-liberal agendas. Given that many developing 
countries lack adequate financial resources, their say at such levels is limited. Invariably, 
the economic policies adopted by this Fund largely benefit wealthier countries. 
Developing countries are also compelled to adopt neo-liberal economic policies which 
may not be beneficial to their developmental goals (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001). 
According to a chief economist offue IMF, Michael Mussa, the Fund's programs " ... are 
like medicine. Some of the medicine has [sic] harmful side effects, and there are real 
questions about what the dosage ought to be. The best that can be hoped for is that we are 
prescribing more or less the right medicine in more or less the right dosage" (Konadu-
Agyemang, 2001, p. 427, emphasis added). Such an admission demonstrates that the 
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Fund is not only aware of how harmful its policies have been to the poor, but also 
indicates the Fund's unwillingness in changing tactics. This is quite worrisome. 
Can the state decline or modify IMF /W orld Bank: policies that it finds harmful to 
its people? The main tool for ensuring that member countries conform to these neo-
liberal policies is the power of the purse. While governments can, in fact, refuse to carry 
out all the policy guidelines of the Fund, defaulting governments are constrained for 
alternative borrowing sources. This has even become more difficult in the present era 
because of the current arrangement for harmonizing all donor aid through the Multi-
Donor-Budgetary Support (MDBS), which started in 2003. Through this system, all 
major donor-aid to Ghana is channeled into budgetary support for the country's poverty 
reduction strategy. While this is expected to inject more predictability in aid flows and 
reduce transaction costs, the common criteria, the GPRS is not wholly owned by the 
state. In other words, the support, though important, will be channeled into a strategy 
which reflects policy guidelines of the IMF and the WB. As evident in the case of the 
GPRS and SAPs, the IMF virtually imposes economic reform programs on borrowing 
countries. This is done through assessments and recommendations. For instance, after 
visiting a country to assess its economic policies and programs, staff of the Fund submits 
a report to the executive board. "The board's views, summarized by its chairman, are 
transmitted to the country's government" (IMF, 2005, no page). This policy statement 
demonstrates clearly how the Fund imposes its policies on beneficiary states. While 
transmission may not directly translate into imposition, in practice, this is the case. In 
Ghana's case, this interference in policy space of the government limits government's 
strategies to the Fund's neo-liberal policies. This not withstanding, the government of 
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Ghana is not an unwilling party in all these negotiations. The Fund cannot exercise 
control over the government without its consent in one way or another. What is arguable 
is that the level of ownership and autonomy the government has over its economic and 
social policies is compromised by the Fund's strict insistence on observing its policy 
guidelines. 
As explicitly stated by the Fund, it is neither a development bank nor an aid 
agency! Consequently, conditionalities applied to loans are " ... a way for the IMF to 
monitor that its loan is being used effectively in resolving the borrower's economic 
difficulties [with neo-liberal prescriptions], so that the country will be able to repay 
promptly, and make the funds available to other members in need" (IMF, 2005, no page). 
The Fund is thus primarily concerned with ensuring that its business is running and 
therefore adopts the policies and programs it deems necessary to ensure that borrowing 
countries make good their payments on loans. This policy statement absolves the Fund 
of blame concerning the fact that it does not pay attention to the non-economic factors in 
its lending practices. This is because its mandate is purely an economic one. 
The reduction in government spending on social services is a direct outcome of 
these stringent financial mechanisms. Ghana government's decision to borrow from the 
IMF must be understood against the background of its knowledge of these neo-liberal 
policies. Therefore, the borrowing government cannot totally shirk responsibility towards 
the provision of social services even under such circumstances. Government agency is 
implicated and negotiated through its relationship with the Fund. As I will demonstrate in 
the discussion of the GPRS, this is done through acquiescence, claims to ownership and 
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actual defense of such policies especially as they fall inline with the ruling government's 
political ideological leanings. 
Unlike the IMF, the World Bank claims to be more 'development' oriented with a 
stated focus on long term policies of poverty reduction in the world's poorest countries. 
The Bank has emerged literally as the 'author' of development for Ghana and other 
developing countries because of its influential position. By creating certain discourses of 
development and following through with policies geared at 'developing' Ghana and other 
beneficiaries of its aid, the Bank clearly defines the direction, progress and level of 
development of Ghana. Generally, as western dominated institutions, the Bank and Fund 
impose Western development models on the rest of the world. This is evidenced in the 
emphasis on neo-liberalism as a centralized economic system throughout the world by 
these institutions (Konadu-Agyemang, 2001). The IMF/World Bank occupy a privileged 
position in the UN system and have grown powerful because of the force and power of 
major contributors behind their operations (Sachs, 2005). Therefore, in the IMFIWorld 
Bank, democracy is built around the dollar. "It is a one dollar one vote" system (Sachs, 
2005, p. 287). Arguably, the Bank and Fund therefore act as ideological messengers for 
their main contributors, whose purposes are served through the promotion of neo-
liberalism in the world. Jeffery Sachs captures this state of affairs when he details how 
differently these two institutions operate from the UN General Assembly where it obtains 
its mandate. The modus operandi of the Bank is contrary to the UN's stated ideal of 'one 
country, one vote'. 
Interestingly, the Bank, according to its stated mission, aims to "help developing 
countries and their people reach the [millennium development] goals by working with 
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[their] partners to alleviate poverty. To do that we concentrate on building the climate for 
investment, jobs and sustainable growth, so that economies will grow, and by investing in 
and empowering poor people to participate in development" (World Bank, 2006, no 
page). While the millennium development goals talk about poverty eradication, the Bank 
discusses poverty alleviation. Yet the Bank claims to be working with developing 
countries towards the realization of this millennium development goal. There does not 
seem to be an agreement on the goal being discussed since the MDGs discuss eradication 
and the WB discusses alleviation. 
The Bank's ideals are lofty, and it uses buzzwords that appear to recognize non-
economic factors in development and poverty. In designing programs of assistance to 
developing countries, however, the Bank's lofty ideals appear to be overshadowed by the 
IMF's concentration on the economic aspect of developmental issues. Even though the 
Bank states that it is interested in the human development aspect of development in 
developing countries, its emphasis on neo-liberal economic policy (exemplified in the 
PRSPs) as a means of achieving poverty alleviation leaves much to be desired. In terms 
of human development, it is important to deconstruct human development from the 
Bank's perspective. The 'official' mandate ofthe Bank emphasizes the need for voices of 
the poor and marginalized to be incorporated in development projects. Again, from the 
examination of its questionable practices, this stated objective is a public relation stunt. 
The recent joint IMF/World Bank initiative, the HIPe, provides ample evidence of this. 
This initiative does not give enough room for adequate participation, and representation 
of poor states in the decision making of the policies that are to be carried out by the 
beneficiary states under the initiative. This is because, Poverty Reduction Strategies 
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Papers are prepared by the WB and expected to be adopted by the beneficiary countries 
under the initiative. This top down approach contradicts the stated objectives of the Banle 
Is there evidence from Ghana's Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) to this effect? Or 
does the document, which is Ghana's developmental framework under the RIPC 
initiative show country ownership of the poverty alleviation programs carried out by the 
state? These issues are the subjects of discussion in chapter three of the thesis. 
Since neo-liberal policies focus more attention on macro-economic policies, the 
provision of basic social services especially to the rural poor has gradually and 
successfully shifted to the domain of NGOs and other charitable organizations in the 
country. In what follows, I provide some general discussion on the contributions of 
NGOs to development and poverty alleviation in Ghana. 
NGOs and Poverty Alleviation in Ghana 
The involvement of NGOs and other private organizations III social servIce 
delivery in Ghana to marginalized communities is not a recent phenomenon. Even though 
NGOs are increasing in number the world over, Clarke argues that "the phenomenon is 
especially significant in Asia, Africa and Latin America" (Clarke, 1998, p. 36). Ghana 
officially registered the first ten NGOs in the country in 1960 (Denkabe, 1996). This 
number rose to three hundred and fifty in the early 1990s, escalating to nine hundred 
NGOs by the mid 1990s with most operating and offering relief services in poor rural 
communities (Denkabe, 1996). This number has since increased considerably. Today, a 
total of over three thousand NGOs are registered in Ghana (Ghana Government, 2006). 
Denkabe further contends that NGO activity in Ghana can be traced to missionary work 
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in Ghana. Missionary activity in Ghana has benefited many people especially in rural 
areas where institutions such as the Catholic Church have been active in building and 
running schools, providing health care facilities and potable water, as well as other 
services mainly to rural areas in the northern sector of the country. Since the colonial 
period, the Catholic Church and other Christian missionary groups have remained some 
of the biggest service providers in this area, providing much needed relief as in the past, 
with some becoming full scale development institutions and organizations. Edwards and 
Hulme (1996) argue that NGOs provided some of these services by 'default since African 
and Asian governments lacked the resources to provide universal coverage [for basic 
social services especially because of the neo-liberal focus of their programs]" (Edwards 
and Hulme, 1996, p. 9 61). Examples of these NGOs include the Christian Mothers 
Association, Catholic Relief Services and Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
International. 
Many other non-religious NGOs have joined the crusade against poverty, 
providing similar services as Christian missionaries in the past. These include ProNet-
North, Simli-Aid, SL and ISODEC. These NGOs have acted as social welfare safety nets, 
absorbing the costs of economic recovery programs and macro economic policies, such 
as SAPs and now the GPRS. Tvedt (1998) asserts that the growth of NGOs is donor 
driven or even donor created (in Townsend et aI, 2004, p. 872). This seems to be the case 
in the present era where NGOs are borne not merely out of need but in response to donor-
interests in particular developmental areas. In many cases, local NGOs develop in 
response to donor interests in these areas. 
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Two main types ofNGOs operate in Ghana, local Ghanaian NGOs (LNGOs) and 
International NGOs (INGOs). In practice, LNGOs operate in partnership with INGOs, 
with INGOs acting mainly as funding partners and groups that provide technical advice 
and support to their Ghanaian counterparts. These LNGOs in tum, also offer funding and 
technical support for development projects in rural communities. NGOs have been 
recognized both by the state and citizens as development partners of the state (SL and 
ProNet-North, September 2006). Many NGOs see their services as crucial to the 
development of the country particularly for rural and deprived areas. They also see their 
roles as complimenting efforts of the state in poverty alleviation. Of late, many NGOs 
have shifted their focus from direct provision of social services to raising civic awareness 
about poverty and educating people in their service areas to be politically active and hold 
the state responsible for these services. Details of this are taken up in chapter four of this 
thesis. 
Although NGOs have provided and continue to provide relief services to many 
deprived areas in Ghana, severe poverty still remains a sad reality to many in rural 
communities. Many LNGOs are not financially self-sufficient, and like the state, rely 
heavily on donor aid to carry out their programs. Given that a lot of these NGOs have 
until recently focused on providing direct social services to rural communities, their 
solutions have not only been affirmative, they have tended to depoliticize poverty in 
Ghana. The causes and solutions of poverty are individualized rather than viewed as 
outcomes of political action and negotiation. However, some NGOs are now advocating 
for poverty to be tackled in the political realm. Some crucial questions arise here. Have 
NGO programs, unlike those of the state, paid equal attention to economic and non-
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economic factors in poverty, or have they merely mirrored the state at a micro-level? Are 
they free of policy constraints from their funding agencies? These issues are taken up in 
the discussion of the services that individual NOOs provide to rural communities in 
chapters three and four of the thesis. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Literature Review 
This chapter provides a review of relevant literature on the topic of poverty 
alleviation and provides a theoretical framework for my study. The literature reviewed 
here is categorized under various sub-headings to make for easy connection with the 
main thematic areas of my thesis. This review leads into a discussion of an appropriate 
critical theoretical framework. In order to relate research findings to existing literature 
and provide grounds for later discussions of findings, interview data related to the 
literature are briefly discussed and taken up in much detail in the discussion segment. 
Literature Review 
There is a vast array of literature on the topic of poverty in general and poverty 
alleviation in particular. While a lot of the literature on poverty alleviation, especially in 
developing countries, focus on the failures of programs implemented for poverty 
alleviation, others have focused exclusively on critiquing IMF /World Bank Policies and 
others still, have focused specifically on NGO operations in developing countries. For 
example, whereas a study carried out by Geo-Jaja and Magnum (2004) on Structural 
Adjustment Programs in Nigeria explicates how this IMF initiative failed to work 
because of the conditions attached to it, another study conducted by Mohan (2004) 
explicates issues of non- representation from local communities in their dealings with an 
NGO in Ghana, citing a situation where the NGO is more accountable to its funding 
partners than the local community. This is corroborated by Veltmeyer and Petras (2001) 
as they discuss ideological implications of NGOs operating in developing countries. 
These studies are taken up in greater detail below, categorized under subheadings. 
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The present study draws from and builds upon previous works on the subject to 
incorporate feminist postmodernist perspectives which highlights limitations of orthodox 
definitions of poverty and the lack of attention paid to recognition and representation in 
issues of poverty alleviation. 
Critique of IMF and WB Policies 
It is generally agreed that developmental aid and loans from the IMF and World 
Bank promote neo-liberal economic models (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001, 2002; 
MacEwan, 1999). These policies contain conditions that promote dependency on these 
institutions by the beneficiary countries. On the subject of policies that promote 
dependency for developing countries in general, Geo-Jaja and Mangum's study (2004) 
assess the impact of SAPs on Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), focusing on human 
development, through an analysis of the educational sector in Nigeria. They argue that 
SAPs have failed not because of problems with implementation, but because of the 
conditions attached to them. This study provides a window for analyzing conditions of 
aid for SSA and the ripple effects of these on poverty alleviation. As they rightly indicate, 
these policies (SAPs) also set the conditions for downsizing public enterprises, 
reducing their staffing ... and creating intrasystem competition between 
educational and health institutions. Only when a government signs these loan 
agreements does the IMF agree to arrange a restructuring of a country's debt that 
includes a provision for a new loan package (p. 45). 
A striking point about the study, which makes it useful for this thesis, is that the IMF 
policies are evaluated within the parameters of their own stated objectives. 
The quotation above speaks directly to the lack of independence or autonomy of 
borrowing governments, as far as loans from the IMF are concerned. Relying on loans 
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that do not tackle the root causes of problems leads to the continuous perpetuation of the 
dependency of Sub-Saharan Africa (Ghana included) on external funding sources. Geo-
Jaja and Magnum's work clearly illustrates the inability of SAPs to deal with poverty 
alleviation because "at the end of the day, the prescriptions have brought neither 
development nor economic relief. Rather they have exacerbated unemployment, poverty, 
and decay in human resource development by requiring governments to cut back 
spending on special services" (p. 47). Another important aspect of this study which I 
draw on for this project is that it touches on the fact that the World Bank is aware of the 
impact of SAPs by implementing safety nets in various countries including Ghana to deal 
with these negative effects. This indicates that the problem is not one of ignorance, which 
can be written off as an unintended consequence of good policies. Instead, it is the lack of 
political will on the part of the IMF and WB and other major power-brokers to deal with 
the problem. 
Engaging critically with the discourse of policies for poverty alleviation, 
Cornwall and Brock (2005) deconstruct the rhetoric of development and poverty 
alleviation and what these actually mean as far as funding and executing pre-planned 
programs are concerned. They assess the use and impact of buzzwords in framing 
development policy and practice through a critical examination of the use of 
'participation, empowerment and poverty reduction' in the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (P.R.S.P) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These two documents are 
very influential in framing intervention strategies for poverty and are the framework for 
most if not all development programs in Ghana and other developing countries. The 
authors assert that the consensus among development practitioners is captured in their use 
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of common buzzwords. My study also finds that, to a large extent, there is a consensus 
among NGOs on the pervasive use of terminologies such as 'participation, local 
community involvement in programs, voice of the people and empowerment' among 
others. 14 Cornwall and Brock critically analyze these buzzwords in order to capture their 
actual meaning in development discourse. Using this methodology, they capture the 
power of discourse in shaping development policy. Indeed, it is clear that the Bretton-
Woods Institutions use "the appropriation of nice- sounding words to dress up business as 
usual" (p. 1044). Furthermore, they assert that, 
discursive framings are important in shaping development practice, even if a host 
of other factors also affects what actually happens on the ground" (p.1045 -
emphasis added). Discourses frame certain problems by distinguishing 'some 
aspects of a situation rather than others ... and as Hajer argues, "in doing so, they 
define the paths of action, containing in their problem-statements certain kinds of 
solutions" (p. 1047). 
My research in some ways confirms some of these issues raised by Cornwall and Brock. 
For instance, even though some NGOs stated that beneficiaries made the decisions about 
the projects they engaged in, they later talked about ways in which beneficiaries were 
'encouraged' to adopt certain programs partially because of the financial incentives that 
came with these 'suggested programs' from the NGOs. The study further demonstrates 
that these may be unintended consequences of well-intentioned policies without any 
hidden agendas. 
In addition, Cornwall and Brock discuss the power of buzzwords in depoliticizing 
poverty. In their analysis of the PRSPS, they explore the co-dependence of 'poverty 
reduction and participation'. Using the example of the implementation of the PRSP in 
Tanzania, Cornwall and Brock argue that: 
14 From interview data 
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the international aid agencies have convinced state representatives to remake their 
multilateral aid relationships into a new breed of 'partnership'. Under the terms 
of this partnership, the donor community promises African government's greater 
'ownership' of their social policies. For the elected leadership, the main perk was 
the increased leeway for political maneuver that the (partial) relief of foreign debt 
can provide. In return, recipient/partner governments are required to commit 
themselves to a multi-tethered program of state reform (p. 1052). 
As stated earlier, discourse plays a major role in intervention strategies for poverty. Even 
though I do not analyze the same buzzwords, the study by Cornwall and Brock is helpful 
in understanding the importance of properly contextualizing discussion of poverty 
alleviation and indeed of operationally defining certain terms so that they are not mixed 
up in mainstream development discourse. Since IFIs are major sponsors of poverty 
alleviation and developmental programs in Ghana, a crucial issue arises as to whether 
these criticisms leveled against them are by implication leveled against the government of 
Ghana (as well as other governments of developing countries) since the government is 
the main implementing body for IFI sponsored programs. In other words, are state 
programs autonomously planned and implemented or are they unduly influenced by IFIs? 
Are NGO programs anymore autonomous than those of the state? 
NGOs and Poverty Alleviation in the Third World 
Amidst criticisms of IMF /WB policies on poverty alleviation, attention has been 
drawn to the role of civil society and NGOs in poverty alleviation. While these may 
appeal to some people because of their non-political nature, analysis by Mohan (2004) 
indicates a not too significant difference between their operations and those of 
governments in developing countries. Moha n's study examines the creative tensions 
between the State and NGOs operating in Ghana. He examines the case of Village Aid, an 
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NGO based in the northern sector of Ghana and analyses the normative challenges of 
international NGOs or internationally funded NGO operations. He contends that even 
though these INGOs work with local partners, local representation is still missing 
because local NGOs are headed by educated elites. This may be due to the fact that as 
discussed by Cornwall and Brock earlier, these 'elitist' NGOs speak the language of 
funding organizations and as such share common grounds with such agencies. Another 
possibility is that local NGOs just tap into the lingo of buzzwords in order to attract 
funding for their projects. The issue at stake is whether or not NGOs are also unduly 
influenced by their funding partners in the implementation of their programs for poverty 
alleviation and 'development'. Mohan's study raises an issue which is crucial to this 
thesis; are NGOs, despite the claim to be representatives of local voices, actually 
representing the interests of these communities? 
Mohan alludes to the problem of accountability ofNGOs to their funding partners 
rather than the local populace for whom they work - a situation discussed extensively by 
Veltmeyer and Petras (2001). The state also finds itself in a very similar situation where it 
has become even more accountable to its paymasters. Mohan's discussion of the ability 
ofNGOs to beat states in the competition for funding addresses the notion that NGOs are 
better at managing funds than state institutions. However, as his study shows, 
" .insidious is the use ofNGOs as vehicles for personal and party political gain by 
local officers. This is achieved through various mechanisms-petty corruption, 
largesse, interlocking political affiliations .. .In effect; some NGOs become 
fiefdoms for local elites to further their material and political status (p. 67). 
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Mohan also asserts that through the mode of delivery of NO Os, they become " ... service 
delivery mechanisms for predetermined development agendas" (p. 69). This is applicable 
to the case of the state as well. 
Although I agree largely with Mohan's assertions, his discussions fail to 
incorporate the power dynamics at play in some of these issues. Without acknowledging 
and understanding the dynamics of power involved in the negotiation for and 
implementation of donor-funds in developmental projects, Mohan assumes that NOOs 
operate with greater autonomy than they actually dO. 15 
Nevertheless, Mohan's study points out the increasing marginalization of locally 
organized NOOs mainly because, in becoming critical of issues of corruption and 
accountability of NO Os, funding agencies have become stringent with funding packages. 
Here, it is the 'elitist', although not necessarily the more accountable NOOs that are able 
to attract funding, not the NOOs that may actually be representative of the people. This 
defeats the purpose of grass-root participation. Mohan's conclusion from this study points 
out a crucial dimension worth exploring. 
While self-help is more likely to embed ownership and inject greater relevance 
into projects, it also serves to place the burden for poverty alleviation on the 
structurally poor which, in turn, leaves NOOs defacto legitimizing SAPs [now 
PRSPs] by filling in the welfare delivery gap .. .. localism diverts attention from 
the structural causes of poverty and feeds into the belief that market-based 
globalization can and should be harnessed to work for the poor... (p. 69-
emphasis added). 
Similarly, Hintjens (1999) asserts that "the state is no longer to be held accountable for 
ensuring that citizens' basic needs are met; instead private citizens, individually and 
collectively, are expected to provide for themselves, however poor or disadvantaged they 
15 This can be inferred from discussions of challenges LNGOs in Ghana face in their relationship with their 
funding partners. These discussions are taken up in chapter four of the thesis. 
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may be" (p. 386, as quoted by Mohan, 2004, p.70). My study finds that although this may 
have been the situation in the past, there is a changing perception about the role of the 
state in the provision of basic needs among the NGO and beneficiary community. While 
pulling out of direct service delivery, many NGOs are at the same time constituting 
strong pressure groups advocating more state involvement in these core areas. 
Overall, however, systemic issues of poverty are ignored in such policies and 
governments of beneficiary countries are held responsible for failures of these affirmative 
programs. This is replicated in rural communities where NGOs expect such communities 
to 'take ownership' of programs they implement. 
Discussing the lack of representation of local interests in NGO programs, Petras 
and Veltmeyer (2001) explore ideological implications ofNGO operations in developing 
countries. In particular, they analyze problems of accountability ofNGOs to their funding 
partners, asserting that their operations carry underlying political ideologies which 
perpetuate the global North-South divide. With at least 50,000 NGOs in the third world, 
poverty is still prevalent. They attribute this problem to the normative challenges of 
imposing western ideologies and programs on developing states. Most of the critiques 
they level at NGOs are exemplified in Mohan's study of Village Aid in Ghana. This 
INGO and its funding partner, are interviewed for this study. 
Since I examine problems related to NGOs taking over responsibility for poverty 
alleviation in Ghana, this study highlights the fact that most NGOs implement short-term 
intervention strategies depending on the funding they receive from donors. Contrary to 
myths of grass-root participant programs by NGOs, Veltmeyer and Petras' work is 
helpful in addressing the fact that programs implemented may actually reflect the broader 
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policy guidelines of funders. My study confirms this. It is important to note, however, 
that irrespective of these criticisms, NGOs have provided invaluable services to many 
deprived communities especially in rural areas since many of the neo-liberal policies 
implemented by the government focus more on macro-economic stability than the 
provision of basic services. NGOs then fill an important gap in development practice in 
local communities. 
On the need for collaboration between state actors and NGOs in the fight against 
poverty, Friedmann (1992) offers a comprehensive analysis of alternative development 
through a re-conceptualization of poverty and its attendant problems. One of the few to 
advocate active and increased state involvement in alternative development and poverty 
alleviation, he advocates a development process which is people-centered and which 
serves the ultimate interests of people. His analysis dwells on both economic and social 
consequences of development for Third World countries. He examines multiple forms of 
oppression that developing countries face because of their poverty. 
Furthermore, Friedmann discusses debates for alternative development put forth 
by some scholars that usually emphasize non-involvement of the state while advocating 
NGOs as the most appropriate group to deal with alternative development. Friedman is, 
however, not convinced that non-state involvement is the answer; he finds inherent 
problems with any such model because of future repercussions. In fact, it is his position 
that, 
although alternative development must begin locally, it cannot end there. Like it 
or not, the state continues to be a major player. It may need to be made more 
accountable to poor people and more responsive to their claims. But without the 
state's collaboration, the lot of the poor cannot be significantly improved. Local 
empowering action requires a strong state (p.7). If the goal of alternative 
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development is to advocate the social empowerment of the poor, it must also 
advocate their political empowerment (Friedmann, 1992, p. 7). 
This central theme which runs through the study, directly informs my own 
advocacy for a strong democratic state in poverty alleviation, and the need for political 
solutions as opposed to charitable ones. This study cautions against corrupt practices by 
the state. It is important to note that claims that governments of Third World countries are 
corrupt are sometimes used to justify stringent control over economic and political 
processes in developing countries. Advocates for NGOs as alternatives to governments of 
developing countries premise their advocacy for these organizations on the basis that 
generally they are assumed to be less corrupt. NGOs are also reputed to engage in 
participatory development practices which empower the poor (Meyer, 1992; Sollis, 1992; 
Vivian, 1994, in Edwards and Hulme 1996; Westergaard and Hossain, 2002). Donors and 
charities give similar reasons for funding NGOs and 'supporting' the poor. 
Unwin's study (2004) advocates the need for a holistic understanding of poverty 
beyond economic need and growth. He argues that understanding poverty as an absolute 
term that can be eliminated through economic growth is dangerous and will have 
negative consequences for the poor and marginalized. He argues for equity as an 
important element in fighting poverty. Furthermore, Unwin contends that budgetary 
support to developing countries without attention "to issues of social equity, difference 
and place make it incapable of delivering the objectives claimed for it by its advocates" 
(p. 1502). Unwin criticizes the policies of the HIPC initiative because of its concern with 
economic growth instead of social equity and difference. He cautions against the myth 
that absolute poverty can be eradicated through economic intervention which is reflected 
in major aid policies such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and HIPC. 
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Applying this to Africa, he shows that "all of the indicators suggest that despite decades 
of development assistance the continent is actually less well off than it was twenty years 
ago and even though this growth model has failed Africa, 'the rhetoric of growth' 
continues to dominate" (Unwin, 2004, p. 1506). 
Although Unwin's study provides a wide criticism of budgetary support to 
governments of developing countries, it is clear that most NGOs in development practice 
also focus on economic growth through so-called self-help programs while ignoring 
various other issues. For instance, SL, one of the NGOs interviewed for this study, 
promotes small business ventures to its beneficiaries as a 'sure way out of poverty'. As 
Unwin (2004) and Ibhawoh (2007) both argue, this is yet another treatment of symptoms, 
not the underlying causes of poverty. Unwin's contention that "a shift in focus to a 
relative understanding of poverty would lead to a fundamental reconsideration of African 
poverty" (Unwin, 2004, p.l517), is timely. He concludes by making several 
recommendations to donors and the international community. The most important of 
these calls, as far as this study is concerned, is the call for donors to "show greater 
commitment to working 'with' the poor rather than 'for' the poor" (p.1528). This call 
advocates the need for lived experiences of poor people to be incorporated into policies 
for poverty alleviation. It is clear that N GOs, the IMF and World Bank in Ghana all seem 
to be working/or, and not with the poor. 
Limitations of Conventional Approaches to Poverty 
Typically, poverty is defined mainly in terms of economic deprivation, or the 
inability to gain access to material goods and services. This "monetary approach to the 
identification of poverty is the most commonly used" (Laderchi, Saith and Stewart, 2003, 
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p. 247). A basic definition of poverty is that it is "the state of being poor and as wants of 
the necessities of life" (The Concise Oxford Dictionary). This definition is broad and 
open ended, lending itself to various interpretations. In this case, the person or group of 
people that define poverty play an important role in deciding what is important in 
poverty, or how the term 'necessities' is interpreted. Anyone with the power to define 
poverty can significantly influence the lives of the poor. Definitions invariably suggest 
solutions to certain social problems including poverty. Similarly, Boltivink (2005) asserts 
that, 
poverty and the poor are associated with a state of want; with deprivation ... such 
deprivation is related to the necessities of life. Thus the term poverty, in its daily 
use, implies a comparison between the conditions of a person, family or human 
group, and the perception of the one who speaks or writes, about what is 
necessary to sustain life (p. 2.). 
As far as developing countries are concerned, institutions such as the World Bank are 
central to the definition of poverty and development. The World Bank's definition of 
poverty is often used as a yardstick in determining developmental aid. The World Bank 
views poverty as being "concerned with the absolute standard of living of a part of 
society-the poor [ ... ] poverty [ .. .is] the inability to attain a minimal standard of living" 
(World Bank, 1990, p. 26). This definition lays emphasis on material needs; it gives little 
indication of non-material aspects of being poor. For example, power relations and 
control have been occluded from this definition. Ironically, the World Bank's dominance 
and power over poor countries is very much a part of what defines them as poor though 
hardly any attention is paid to this aspect of the problem. 
Jones (2004) argues that the definition of poverty offered by the World Bank is 
" ... an empiricism which identifies empirically manifest wants with needs ... one that is 
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blind to the real, non-empirical relations that generate empirical appearances" (quoted in 
Carroll, 2004, p.149). Jones sees the definition of poverty merely in economic terms as 
reductionistic, and bordering on empiricism. Jones further postulates that, such empiricist 
approaches to poverty alleviation "sticks to surface appearances and denies the existence 
of real but non-empirical structures and causal mechanisms" (Carroll, 2004, p.156). Jones 
asserts that poverty should be conceptualized as "a condition in which human needs are 
not adequately met and the realization of various human powers is restricted or 
prevented" (Jones, 2005, p.l49). She further postulates that, from an orthodox 
perspective, poverty is seen to be a problem to be tackled by private charity. The 
solutions offered represent at the most the amelioration of affairs, or symptom 
suppression (p. 156). 
Jones' argument provides a good reference point for analyzing orthodox 
approaches to the fight against poverty. Her critique of the World Bank's definition of 
poverty in economic terms reflects the deep-seated problem of definitions and 
intervention strategies based on a narrow conception of poverty. This is reflected in the 
focus of the GPRS. It is important to note that although Jones' point about adopting a 
holistic approach to poverty is central to this thesis, a total neglect of the empirical 
economic issues only presents a reverse situation where poverty is equally narrowly 
conceived. 
Carroll (2004) has argued that as a hegemonic development institution, "the 
agenda and advice of the world bank is central to any orthodox understanding of poverty 
and attempts at poverty alleviation [ ... ]" (p.l45). Given its dominance in the world, 
statements on poverty from the World Bank are important in determining the fate of the 
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poor as far as policies and funding are concerned. This dominance is evident in the 
Ghanaian situation where policies have far reaching implications even for the operations 
of NGOs that do not receive funding from the Banle For instance, the World Bank's 
policy on cost sharing for rural water in Ghana has affected the operations of ProNet-
North which provides potable water to rural communities. This, according to the 
executive director of Pro Net-North, is because as NGOs, they operate within broad policy 
frameworks of government, whose policies are influenced largely by IFls (PII2, ProNet-
North, September 2006). 
Given that the poor are also powerless, it is apparent that poverty is not only 
defined for and on behalf of the poor, policies for its alleviation are shaped around 
economic redistribution, with little attention to non-economic aspects of it. Concentrating 
on increasing the income levels of poor countries or people in itself does not translate 
into power for self-representation and determination. A study carried out in Ghana and 
other developing countries by Narayan (2002) revealed that people in rural communities 
in Ghana assert poverty in terms of conditions and issues that exclude them from fully 
participating in community life. Participants in the study generally stated that life 
(without money and other economic resources) in the past was more bearable than it is 
now where having a good life has come to be increasingly tied to having economic and 
monetary resources (Narayan, 2002). 
Overall, Maxwell (1999) asserts that in terms of measuring poverty from both 
monetary and non-monetary components, 
so-called money-metric measures are often used, because they are either regarded 
as sufficient on their own or seen as an adequate proxy for poverty. However, 
there is a clear fault line between definitions of poverty which are restricted to 
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income (or consumption) and those that incorporate such factors as autonomy, 
self-esteem or participation. [ ... ] (Allen and Thomas, 2000, p.13). 
This theorizing suggests that measures of poverty that exclude mention of power, 
autonomy and recognition only partially capture the issue. By extending the definition to 
cover social exclusion, and general exclusion from decision-making, domination and 
oppression, one captures fully, the problems of poor people. I think that the bigger 
problem of poor people is not the lack of material possessions but the inability to fully 
express themselves in a platform where they are at least guaranteed an audience. 
In order to adequately understand poverty, its various dimensions need to be taken 
into account. Its multifaceted and multidisciplinary nature needs to be captured in order 
to present a holistic picture (Narayan, 2002). It is said that no matter how knowledgeable 
a doctor may be, it is only the patient who really knows how it hurts and where. In 
Ghana, poor people are really the only ones who can describe what it is like to be poor. It 
is therefore important that the voices of the poor be fully incorporated into policy making 
for poverty alleviation. What is even more important is that the service providers that 
work for them understand poverty from the perspective of the poor, their beneficiaries. 
In Narayan's (2002) two field studies conducted in Ghana, many poor people saw 
poverty as the inability to afford basic resources such as food and being voiceless and 
powerless and having few choices. "Poor people are acutely aware of their lack of voice, 
power and independence that subjects them to exploitation" (Narayan, 2000, p. 31). 
Incorporating the multifaceted nature of poverty in her conceptualization of poverty, 
Awumbila (2004) argues that poverty results in both 'physiological deprivation' and 
'lack of knowledge and participation in civil society and to the denial of opportunities 
and choices basic to human life or development' (A wumbila, 2004, p. 9). Even though 
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this definition draws attention to non-economic aspects of poverty, it is not clear what 
Awumbila refers to as 'lack of knowledge ... ". It is important that NGOs that work at the 
grassroots level recognize the knowledge and local expertise of people they work with, or 
for. 
Since poverty is universally experienced, the experiences of poverty by 
Ghanaians though particular, could be better dealt with within universal calls for poverty 
alleviation. Indeed, universal appeals for poverty alleviation are linked to the concept of 
human rights. 
Human Rights Approaches to Poverty Alleviation 
Poverty as a case of injustice is also a human rights issue. Two broad sets of 
rights make up the framework of human rights; Civil and Political (CP rights) and 
Economic, Social and Cultural (ESC rights). CP rights embody various civil and political 
sets of rights including the right to representation, and participation in decision-making. 
For the purposes of this study, these constitute recognition. ESC rights on the other hand 
include rights to economic resources, right to a decent standard of living, cultural 
recognition16 and social belonging. These constitute redistribution in this study. These 
sets of rights are interconnected. Human rights advocates approach poverty as a violation 
of people's basic rights to material needs and participation, and therefore recognize the 
need for both economic redistribution and recognition or political self-representation as a 
way of addressing human rights violations associated with poverty. It must be noted here 
that this human rights framework immediately introduces some of the creative tensions 
embedded in the recognition-redistribution model. In mainstream discussions on poverty, 
16 Cultural recognition appropriately belongs to the set of rights that constitute recognition in this study. 
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there is a consensus that recognition is inadequate in the design and implementation of 
poverty alleviation programs. However, in the human rights framework, the opposite is 
true. 
If poverty is a violation of fundamental human rights of the poor, then the ability 
to name the violator of these rights (in human rights discourse) in order to hold them 
accountable for such violations should be possible (at least theoretically). Through their 
advocacy campaigns, a rights-based NGO in Ghana, the Integrated Social Development 
Centre (ISODEC), has used this methodology effectively to the benefit of the poor. Using 
the media as a sounding board, ISODEC openly criticizes government policies, indicating 
how such policies violate the rights of ordinary citizens. A detailed discussion of this is 
taken up later in this thesis. Given the complex nature of global poverty, this task is a lot 
more complicated if not impossible. While multiple factors account for individual and 
state poverty, it is not clear if any particular states or institutions should be blamed for the 
plight of the poor. If blame seems a little far-fetched, is it possible to hold any institution 
responsible for global inequalities? Probably, what is more feasible is the argument that 
certain policies of certain global institutions or states perhaps unintentionally tend to 
worsen the already existing problem of poverty and inequality. Is there a justification for 
ending poverty as it relates to human rights? In what ways are human rights discourses 
relevant to the issue of poverty alleviation in general and poverty in Ghana in particular? 
that, 
Article 25, section 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR) states 
everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
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unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control (Ishay, 1997, p. 411). 
This article clearly articulates the universal nature of human rights. However, it must be 
noted that the relative nature of implementation presents a whole other debate on which 
rights should be implemented where and how and according to what criteria. 
Furthermore, article 22 of the UDHR places the responsibility of ensuring universal 
human rights on both the national and international community as follows: 
everyone, as member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each state, of the economic, 
social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of 
his personality (Ishay, 1997, p. 410). 
Economic redistribution is an important aspect of tackling poverty as a human rights 
issue. However, recognition and representation need to be taken in tandem with economic 
redistribution in order not to violate political rights of the poor. Given that article 22 of 
the UDHR (quoted above) holds both national governments and the international 
community equally responsible for allocating resources to poor people the world over, 
the manner in which the resources should be allocated is not clearly indicated. These 
should correspond to principles of CP rights. Mere membership to the human race is all 
that is needed to enjoy the entitlements set forth in the UDHR. Consequently, due to the 
uneven nature of global resource allocation, wealth redistribution from the global North 
to the global South is one way of ensuring that people everywhere get a certain minimum 
allocation of resources sufficient to their needs. 
Arguing for resource allocation from the global North to the global South on the 
basis of the UDHR alone presents various challenges. The UDHR, in itself is not a 
legally binding document. Historically, ESC rights to a large extent were rights that 
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national governments and the international community were encouraged to make 
progressive provisions for in specific programs (Ishay, 1997). This provision is 
recognized by Ghana's Constitution and the international covenant of economic, social 
and cultural rights. Therefore, ESC rights, while claiming universality are mainly not 
universally judicially enforceable. In fact, at the international level, there is no clear 
mechanism in place to ensure that the international community lives up to its obligations. 
Mapulanga-Hulston (2002) argues that ESC rights are necessary for the realization of 
civil and political rights. The deprivation of one set of rights invariably leads to a 
violation of the other. When rights are given judicial legal backing, they are better 
enforced than when left as only justiciable. To ensure that the rights of poor people are 
not violated, it is important that the enforcement mechanism for human rights be 
strengthened. Poverty alleviation should therefore not remain only a social ideal, and in 
the realm of justiciable rights, it should gain judicial support to ensure enforcement by 
both states and the international community. Countries such as South Africa have taken 
bold steps by making the provision of these rights legally binding on the state irrespective 
of the argument that there may be resource scarcity. Perhaps, this is only possible within 
the domestic front. How can this be achieved internationally? 
Pogge (2005) contends that a large transfer of material resources to the Third 
World to end poverty would not affect the wealth of rich countries. Sachs (2005) supports 
this assertion. According to Pogge, very minimal financial commitment is required from 
rich countries to end extreme poverty. However, this gets complicated if the only reason 
for advocating the transfer of wealth is on moral grounds. This is because it becomes 
difficult to advocate that wealth redistribution be pursued in tandem with recognition. 
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Secondly, making a case for adequate level of representation by developing states 
becomes problematic since they appear to be recipients of largesse in a case of wealth 
redistribution. Moral appeals alone to ending poverty are problematic because they rely 
on goodwill from benefactors. Consequently, beneficiaries are then expected to be 
grateful for the favour. It implicitly sets up a hierarchy between giver and receiver with 
little room for the voice and representation of the recipient. Pogge's arguments suggest 
that affluent countries are at least responsible for the plight of the poor. Probably, in 
order to actually argue that poverty be tackled in the political realm, it is necessary to find 
out what ties developing nations like Ghana have to global wealth. Are they part owners 
of wealth in the world? If they are not, is there even a basis for advocating redistribution? 
Is it enough to apply the universal claims of the UDHR to people everywhere without any 
further justification? How can such moral appeals be upheld? 
Arguably, colonialism initiated hierarchical relations between the global South 
and the North. The establishment of dominator-subordinate relationship in that sense is 
re-enacted in present day relationships between rich and poor countries. Occupying the 
subordinate position has weakened developing states as far as voice and representation is 
concerned. I agree with Pogge's (2004) assertion that 'a morally deeply tarnished history 
must not be allowed to result in radical inequality' (p. 203). Since it already has, steps 
should be taken to remedy it. Why is this position so entrenched even today, several 
decades after the colonial period? Here, Pogge's (2004, 2005) postulation that shared 
international institutions, such as the UN, World Bank etc, retain positions of dominance 
and implement policies which are not necessarily beneficial to developing countries, is 
useful in understanding the interlocking issues of interdependence and dependence in the 
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global system. Such institutions have merely served to legitimize the hierarchical 
relationship between the global North and global South, which to an extent also 
legitimizes marginalization and exploitation of developing countries. As indicated in 
earlier discussions, it is clear that the World Bank and IMF dictate the pace and standards 
of development and help transmit dominant western standards of development to the rest 
of the world mainly through trade liberalization and neo-liberalism. Unfortunately, 
contrary to the rhetoric for prosperity, it is common knowledge that trade liberalization 
has not benefited developing countries. If anything, there are more losses than gains 
(Taylor, 1991; Stiglitz, 2002). 
McMorrow (1993) argues for international obligations to fight poverty as a matter 
of ensuring human rights for the poor. Drawing on the political theory of Emmanuel 
Kant, she asserts that, 
ending absolute poverty is more than an optional international (or national) 
project, aspiration, or ideal. Ending absolute poverty is an obligation that binds 
rich and poor states alike-an obligation generated by the basic human right of 
subsistence and activated at the international level by the extent, severity, and 
geopolitical configuration of the destitute (p. 41). 
By making a strong moral argument for fighting poverty, McMorrow appeals not only to 
the international community, but to individuals as well as developing countries to ensure 
subsistence for the poor. Again, moral appeals usually have relative binding effects. 
While calling on rich states to contribute their surplus resources to fighting deprivation in 
the world, McMorrow equally challenges developing countries to ensure accountability 
and transparency in order to justify the resource investment. No matter the argument, 
both beneficiary and lending states have different obligations to meeting this basic need 
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of people. Political will to alleviate/reduce poverty cannot end at the intemationallevel. It 
must be complemented with local effort from poor or developing countries. 
The human rights appeal in poverty alleviation is perhaps the strongest because of 
its universalist claims for human dignity. However, can the poor in Ghana hope that such 
appeals will help, given that within those universalist appeals, Ghana's case stands out as 
different from other cases in the world? Indeed, can there be a universal blueprint 
applicable to all areas under the human rights umbrella to help fight poverty? 
Additionally, exploring the various reasons for the justification of human rights, 
Orend (2002) asserts that human rights are 'elemental moral commitments which we 
share' (p. 76). As already stated earlier, moral relativism weakens his arguments since 
they do not convey a universal binding effect. Despite this criticism, Orend argues that 
various principles can be offered to justify a human rights approach to poverty 
alleviation. These include the following two principles. First, the principle of personal 
prudence. This stipulates that one should respect the rights of others because it is in one's 
best interest to do so since one would expect reciprocity in the future. This is said to be 
ingrained in human nature - people have a need to be treated with respect and dignity at 
all times-. This is a good reason to respect the dignity of other people. Second, the 
principle of consequentialism holds that the violation of human rights has serious 
repercussions for the victim as well as the victim's close associates. This principle would 
have been a strong argument for justifying human rights except that it insists on human 
happiness, which has also been criticized as a vague concept since what constitutes 
happiness varies from place to place (Shyns, 2004; Duncan, 2005). What has been the 
contribution of the human rights framework to poverty alleviation in Ghana? 
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The human rights movement has until recently not paid enough attention to issues 
of poverty, which constitute serious human rights violations. As many advocates of 
human rights have postulated, it is almost impossible to achieve true political and civil 
rights without first ensuring that people's basic subsistence needs have been met 
(Ibhawoh, 2007). Indeed according to Ibhawoh, the intricacies of CP and ESC rights are 
such that they are inseparable. They are mutually dependent and reinforcing. This human 
rights framework is indispensable to the fight for poverty alleviation in developing 
countries like Ghana because it emphasizes both redistribution and recognition. Secondly, 
the framework's claim to universality justifies the allocation of resources from wealthy 
countries to developing countries to fight poverty. 
In addition, Ibhawoh addresses some of the challenges international human rights 
NGOs face in their advocacy for economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights in developing 
countries. He contends that INGOs are not insensitive to local cultural situations as they 
are often accused of, because they operate with local partners. In this study, the case of 
the international NGO, Village Aid, which works with the local NGO, Simli Aid 
validates this claim. However, there are still subtle issues of control, dependency and 
perhaps, cultural imperialism. A detailed discussion of these and other issues are taken up 
in Chapter Four of the thesis. An important aspect of Ibhawoh's study addresses the 
important role discourse plays in shaping the ideology and intervention of western 
INGOs in developing countries. He asserts that "INGOs tend to portray the non-western 
subjects as needy, incapable of self government, and in need of long term external 
assistance" (Ibhawoh, 2007, p. 8). This echoes Cornwall and Brock's (2005) study on 
poverty alleviation discourses. This study points out the fact that IFIs are also responsible 
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for human rights violations through the stringent conditions they set out in loan 
agreements which include budgetary cuts in social spending, or placing costs on basic 
services such as water supply. There is ample evidence of this in the untold hardships 
SAPs inflicted on the poor in Ghana. 
Conclusion from Literature Review 
In conclusion, the literature reviewed here highlights a number of important issues 
crucial to my thesis. First, discourse plays an important role in shaping particular 
responses to poverty alleviation. In this case, conventional discourses on poverty limit 
intervention strategies to economic/material distribution. Consequently, more emphasis is 
placed on economic redistribution as a means to solving the problem of poverty. This 
approach excludes solutions for non-economic aspects of poverty. This is evidenced in 
the human rights framework in prioritizing civil and political rights over economic, social 
and cultural rights in human rights discourse. Socio-political empowerment and voice 
appear to be lacking in such approaches and in cases where they are addressed, their 
inclusion appears inadequate. Finally, developing countries like Ghana rely 
overwhelmingly on external aid for development. This form of dependency has serious 
implications for self-determination and autonomy of both the nation and its citizens; and 
finally, poverty infringes on the basic human rights of people. 
Theoretical Influences 
This section discusses the various theoretical perspectives that have informed the 
conception of my research problem as well as informed the framework for the study. 
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These include theories of redistributive justice and recognition, human rights, 
international political economy and critical developmental. 
Writing from a critical feminist perspective, Young (1990) presents a critical 
analysis of the tendency to reduce issues of justice to the realm of distribution of material 
resources. According to her, more critical issues of oppression, marginalization and 
powerlessness among others cannot be adequately addressed within a model of material 
redistribution. She emphasizes the need for recognition in the fight for social justice. 
Young's analysis resonates with Fraser's contention that social justice requires both 
redistribution and recognition (Fraser, 1995). According to Young, distributive injustice 
(in this case poverty) may contribute to and or result from the five faces of oppression, 
which she identifies as Exploitation; Marginalization; Powerlessness (whereby people do 
not participate regularly or even ever in making decisions that affect their lives and 
actions); Cultural imperialism (the universalism of dominant group's culture and 
experiences as the norm to which others must follow- making other's cultural beliefs and 
practices inferior) and Violence. 
Three of these faces, marginalization, powerlessness and cultural imperialism are 
central to this study as they provide a window for analyzing the non-economic and socio-
cultural and political nature and consequences of poverty. Beyond these, I incorporate 
another face, that of dependency. With some modification, I use these faces to examine 
power dynamics of poor communities in their dealings with NGOs as well as the 
government of Ghana in its negotiations for aid at the international level, in order to 
showcase the type of oppression poverty entails, both locally and internationally. 
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Furthermore, Young postulates that instead of focusing on distribution, a 
conception of justice should begin with concepts of domination and oppression. She 
further states that in the case where there are clear differences between various social 
groups, that difference should be acknowledged so as to undermine oppression. Young's 
reaction to mainstream theories within the distributive paradigm of social justice can be 
summarized in the following statement. 
The distributive paradigm implicitly assumes that social judgments are about what 
persons have, how much they have, and how that amount compares with what 
other persons have. This focus on possession tends to preclude thinking about 
what people are doing, according to what institutional rules, how their doings 
and having are structured by institutionalized relations that constitute their 
positions, and how the combined effect of their doings has recursive effects on 
their lives (Young, 1990, p.l03- emphasis added). 
Young's theorizing can be applied with modification to analyzing the relationship 
between rich donor states and poor developing countries. Moreover, her focus on 
institutional structures is useful in analyzing the need to change the present existing 
relationship between the two where it appears that one dictates and the other obeys. In 
order for developing countries to actually have control over their domestic economic and 
social policies, the current 'shared' institutions need to be restructured in a way that 
allows these nations to have a say in the conditions that are attached to loans and other 
developmental funding packages. 
As far as the inadequacies of the distributive approach to justice (and poverty 
alleviation in this case) are concerned, Young identifies two primary problems. First, it 
tends to focus thinking of social justice on the allocation of material goods and resources 
or the distribution of social positions. Second, by extending this distributional paradigm 
to non material goods such as rights, power, opportunity etc, they are represented as 
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though they were static things produced independently of social interaction and 
relationships. She further asserts that the distributive paradigm tends to depoliticize, by 
not tackling issues of decision-making power and other forms of oppression. This 
reiterates the point made earlier, that by not tackling relational issues of poverty and other 
non-economic aspects of poverty, an important aspect of the problem is overlooked or 
inadequately dealt with. De-politicization occurs when political issues such as poverty are 
pushed to the domain of charities, exemplified in NGO activities in Ghana. Also, by 
locating the solution of poverty within the local, NGOs suggest that poverty has local 
causes. They therefore do not adequately address the problems of external institutional 
causes of poverty (Ibhawoh, 2007). Solutions sought in this way are temporary and 
affirmative. 
From the analyses so far, it is clear that to effectively find a solution to poverty or 
severe material inequality, it is important to focus on the systems and processes that 
produce distribution. Young's theorization captures the importance of institutional 
oppression. For instance, according to Young, oppression refers to 'structural phenomena 
that immobilize or diminish a group' (ibid, p.42). Thus while 'oppression constrains self-
development; domination constrains self-determination' (p. 42). 
Advocating for a combination of both redistribution and recognition, Nancy 
Fraser (1993, 1995) provides clear theoretical grounding for this project particularly 
because she postulates that both redistribution and recognition should be pursued in 
tandem in social justice advocacy. Fraser argues that cultural injustice is different from 
socio-economic injustice but that people can, and usually do suffer both at the same time. 
Creative tensions exist between redistribution and recognition to the point where they 
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appear almost incompatible. However, Fraser proposes that despite these tensions, both 
recognition and redistribution are needed to deal with cases of injustice since neither is 
sufficient on its own. Since the two are intertwined, Fraser advocates the use of 
transformative remedies that may solve both issues. She identifies two forms of remedies: 
political-economic structuring for economic injustice (redistribution) and recognition for 
cultural injustice. Redistribution calls for de-differentiation while recognition calls for 
differentiation of groups. This raises a crucial question. How do bivalent categories, i.e., 
people subject to both cultural and economic injustice remedy the situation when 
according to the paradigm they have to claim and deny their specificity at the same time? 
In the case of developing countries that depend on loans and aids from international 
financial institutions and other developed countries, they claim specificity as poor and 
developing countries on the one hand, while on the other hand, denying that their poverty 
or underdevelopment should prevent them from adequately representing themselves on 
the international stage and sharing powers of decision-making equally with developed 
countries. Ghana and the poor in Ghana are bivalent categories because they require 
these. In other words, they deny and reclaim their specificity at the same time in dealing 
with poverty. On the one hand, they claim specificity as poor people who need special 
recognition yet deny this specificity in order to reject and or protest marginalization. 
In this case, the kind of redistribution carried out in Ghana does not even fit into 
these criteria. Or rather, the insistence on good governance and domestic macro-
economic restructuring seem to be the redistribution described here. This is however still 
affirmative, not transformative. This is because, despite recognition for the need of social 
policies, these are usually added to the macro-economic policies, not integrated in the 
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design of these policies (Elson, 2000). In fact in many instances, as in the case of the 
GPRS, social policies that are expected to yield desirable outcomes such as poverty 
alleviation are predicated on the performance of the macro-economic sector. 
According to Fraser, without addressing structural causes and problems associated 
with injustices, solutions to social injustices will remain affirmative. Transformative 
strategies are "aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the 
underlying generative framework" (Fraser, 1995, p. 82). The WB's generative framework 
needs overhauling or drastic changes to accommodate elements of transformative 
solutions. In order to reverse this trend of dependency and marginalization, it is 
important to argue for alternative development models to move away from the economic 
model consistent with a capitalist oriented western model of development. In other 
words, the economic growth of nations is important but only in so far as citizens of the 
nation state own the development projects, and indeed define the kind of development 
they are interested in. 
Friedmann (1992) defines alternative development as 'improving the conditions 
of life and livelihood for the excluded majority, whether on a global, national, or even 
regional scale' (p.37). This means among other things that people for whom development 
is intended must be empowered at all levels. Therefore, giving citizens a say in matters 
concerning them at the local level implies a strong state which is able to advocate for its 
citizenry at the international/global front. In the case of Ghana, decentralization programs 
provide people opportunities to participate in planning development programs. 17 These 
17 Decentralization as an administrative policy has been established in Ghana. However, a lot oflocal 
decentralized government offices still lack institutional capacity to effectively deal with participatory 
development. 
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structures, for various reasons are however constrained from functioning efficiently. 
Furthermore, Friedmann opines that the principles of human rights, citizen rights, and 
human flourishing are three principles on which claims of entitlement to adequate 
material conditions of life, and active involvement in political life are premised. Citizen 
rights are specific to states and outline citizens' autonomy vis-a vis the state. Therefore, 
all citizens must have the rights and privileges that everyone else enjoys. 
Emmanuel Kant is among many theorists that explicitly argued that the provision 
for the poor should be the matter of the state rather than private obligation (Fleishacker, 
2004, p. 68). According to Fleishacker (2004), Kant sees state provision for the poor as 
encompassing more dignity for the poor than private charity which he asserts has some 
moral corruption which flatters the giver while degrading the receiver. Even though the 
agendas of many developing countries are focused on poverty reduction and 
development, most of these programs are dictated and or imposed on them from their 
benefactors as in the case of Ghana. In this case, these programs should be determined 
freely by the states or beneficiaries of the programs. The debate over whose legal 
responsibility it is to provide aid is increasingly being replaced by a moral obligation to 
provide aid. According to Kant, the deeper problem with charity is 'the implicit hierarchy 
it sets up between giver and recipient' (Fleishacker, 2004, p. 72). 
There is a difference between justice and beneficence. The work of charity and in 
some cases NGOs is beneficence since it is done more out of goodwill than obligation. 
The Roman thinker Cicero in 'De Officiis' articulates an important distinction between 
justice and beneficence where he sees justice as a required legal obligation of people 
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while beneficence is not (Fleishacker, 2004, p. 21). The difference between state and 
charitable organizations for justice and beneficence respectively is characterized by 
associating justice with Caesar and charity with Christ (Fleishacker, 2004, p. 21). This 
distinction is important in understanding problems associated with shifting justice to the 
domain of charity, since it is not a social requirement of people to help out others, 
especially strangers. 
Certain hegemonic discourses of development dominate development practices. 
In fact according to Escobar (1994), 'the study of development discourse is akin to Said's 
study of the discourses on the Orient' (p. 6). In Orientalism, Said (1978) alludes to the 
fact that certain discourses created the orient, portraying it as something which must be 
feared and controlled. According to Said, 
orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing 
with the Orient-dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views 
of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as 
a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the 
Orient ... ' (quoted in Escobar, 1994, p. 6). 
The above quotation speaks to the use of language by dominant world institutions or 
powers to cast the 'Other' in a manner that suggests how this Other should be perceived 
and eventually treated. This is evidenced in development discourse, moral appeals for aid 
by NGOs and charities among others. Since these discourses tend to authorize views 
about this Other, it also suggests solutions to problems faced by the other without 
necessary consultation or communication with the Other. Even where there is 
communication, preconceived notions about the Non-Western Other tend to influence 
responses to the Other's own ideas. The normative criticisms leveled against NGOs as 
carriers of imperialism (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001) are exemplified here in the 
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continuous 'authoring' and shaping of, the path of development for Third World 
communities. Thus, the preconceived notions of 'the Third World' influence the drawing 
up of poverty alleviation programs by NGOs, the WB and Fund on 'perceived need' of 
people/communities resulting from discourses created about them as the Other. 
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Chapter Three: Conceptualizing Poverty in Ghana 
The language of politics is intimately related to the politics of language (Veltmeyer and 
Petras, 2001, p.l21). 
This chapter examines the conception of poverty in Ghana, as well as economic 
redistributive and recognition based approaches to poverty alleviation. I focus on 
analyzing state poverty alleviation strategies with particular emphasis on the GPRS under 
the HIPC initiative as a major policy document for poverty alleviation in Ghana. I argue 
that the state's macro-economic policies, though voluntarily adopted by the government, 
have been significantly influenced by policies of the Bretton-Woods institutions. These 
policies, while satisfying donor-policy requirements, and recording gains at the macro-
level, have not addressed Ghana's powerlessness as a poor country and have sometimes 
exacerbated poverty, especially for the rural poor. Potentially, these macro-economic 
policies could be transformative if they incorporated true recognition and did not localize 
both the solutions and causes of poverty. The UNDP has argued that even though 
economic growth is "an important prerequisite for elimination of poverty, it is not a 
sufficient condition" (Elson, 2000, p. 1353). 
Understanding Poverty as Powerless In Ghana 
Poverty is predominantly a rural phenomenon In Ghana. The National 
Development Planning Commission of Ghana (NDPC), which provides the policy 
framework for the country's development, estimates that over seventy percent (70%) of 
Ghana's poor live in rural areas with food crop farmers being the worst affected. As far 
as development and poverty are concerned, the NDPC plays a crucial role in determining 
priority areas of concentration. For instance, the GPRS was prepared by the NDPC. 
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Poverty in Ghana is understood by the NDPC to be multi-dimensional and multi-faceted. 
The commission identifies three main dimensions of poverty. These are, 
income or consumption dimension, access to social services dimension and the , 
participatory dimension of poverty.... The social services access dimension of 
poverty includes lack of access to health-care, education, good drinking water, 
decent housing and healthy sanitation. The participatory dimension includes lack 
of voice and political rights (NDPC, 2005, p.2). 
In terms of income and consumption rates, participants in a recent study by Narayan 
(2002), specifically a focus group of women, in a village in Ghana (Dobile Yirkpong), 
stated that the definition of a livable life has changed drastically with more emphasis now 
placed on money. Therefore, according to these participants, "having deep pockets' 
means having clothing, modem housing, property, a car, and the means to educate 
children" (Narayan, 2002, p. 42). To paint a more vivid picture of poverty in Ghana, the 
following extract from Narayan's study gives a description of Dobile Yirkpong, one of 
many poor rural communities in Ghana. It is important to note that this description does 
not adequately capture non-economic issues related to poverty in this community. This 
description is also focused on espousing problems the community faces without any 
detail on their agency in navigating these issues. 
Dobile Yirkpong, Upper West Region (population 330) is a suburb of Wa, the 
capital of the Upper West Region ... seventy-five percent of adult men are farmers 
and each farmer owns some livestock, usually goats, sheep, cattle, and guinea 
fowl. Men also engage in masonry, petty trade, and carpentry, and work as 
guards. The women are predominantly traders of vegetables and firewood. They 
also help their husbands to farm and some rear animals. Dobile Yirkpong has no 
school, no electricity, and no sewerage. Pipe-borne water is not readily available, 
so the community obtains water from hand-dug wells, although they are believed 
to be infested with guinea worm (Narayan, 2002, p. 45). 
The picture of Dobile Yirpkong to a large extent represents prevailing conditions in other 
rural areas in Ghana. The inability to afford basic necessities is a course of concern for 
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many. As one participant from Dobile clearly puts it, "food is life, and no hungry man 
can claim to have a good life" (Narayan, 2002, p. 20). This statement captures issues of 
powerlessness associated with poverty. The term 'good life' as used here also represents 
a number of things, including the ability to participate in decision-making; self-
representation and recognition. The tables below illustrate key poverty indicators in 
Ghana. 18 
18 These tables are taken from the Human Development Report 2006. Ghana country fact sheet (F:\Human 
Development Report 2006 - Country Fact Sheets - Ghana.htm) 
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TallitH: Ghana's human developmel,1t index 2004 
1. Norway (0.965) 
134. Pakistan (0.539) 
135. Bhutan (0.538) 
136. Ghana (0.532) 
137. Bangladesh (0.530) 
138. Nepal (0.527) 
177. Niger (0.311) 
.. Lifct;!xpcct/j,ru:Y at 
·"birt)I. 
(years) 
I. Japan (82.2) 
130. Yemen (61.1) 
131. Myanmar (60.5) 
132. Ghana (57.0) 
133. Sudan (56.5) 
134. Cambodia (56.5) 
177. Swaziland (31:?) 
1. Georgia (100.0) 
109. Burundi (59.3) 
rate:, 
oldet) ••. 
110. Timor-Leste (58.6) 
111. Ghana (57.9) 
112. Papua New Guinea (57.3) 
113. Togo (53.2) 
.l~~.: .. ~ali( I? :9) 
CombinetlWimary,sccondary .. 
. :andtertiiu1' .grOi!lS enrolment· . 
ratio 
(%) 
1. Australia (113.2) 
149. Mozambique (48.6) 
GDP per capita 
(PPPlJS$) 
1. Luxembourg (69,961) 
121. Papua New Guinea (2,543) 
150. Tanzania, U. Rep. of(47.8) 122. Cambodia (2,423) 
151. Ghana (47.2) 
".w .. " ..... ~~, ••• 
152. Solomon Islands (47.1) 
153. Comoros (46.3) 
172. Niger(~L5) 
123. Ghana (2,240) 
124. Pakistan (2,225) 
125. Angola (2.180) 
172. Sierra LeoTle (561) 
Table 2:se~,ctedindicatol"$ of human poverty for Ghana 
Human Poverty 
Index 
(HPI!",l) 
2004 
1. Uruguay (3.3) 
56. Comoros (31.6) 
··57. Namibia (32.5) 
ProbablUty of not survlvllig 
past age 40 
(%) 
~()04 
1. Hong Kong, China (SAR) (1.5) 
130. Sudan (27.0) 
131. Eritrea (27.6) 
58. Ghana (33.1) 132. Ghana (27.7) 
59. Morocco (33.4) 133. Madagascar (27.8) 
60. Kenya (35.5) 134. Gambia (27.8) 
102. Mali (60.2) 172, SWCizUand (]4.3) 
Adult illiteracy fate 
(%ages U and Olde~) 
2004 " 
1. Cuba (0.2) 
99. Sudan (39.1) 
100. Burundi (40.7) 
101. Ghana (42.1) 
people wltltoutaccess to an 
Improved water source 
""'" "',{%) 
2004 
1. Bulgaria (1) 
79. Senegal (24) 
80. Central African Republic (25) 
81. Ghana (25) 
102. Papua New Guinea (42.7) 82. Bangladesh (26) 
103. Togo (46.8) 
.. 117. Mali (81.0) 
83. Rwanda (26) 
12~'E:thiopia (78). 
Children underweight ·for 
itge 
(% ages O-S) 
,2004 
1. Chile (1) 
90. Solomon Islands (21) 
91. Tanzania, U. Rep. of (22) 
92. Ghana (22) 
93. Malawi (22) 
94. Guatemala (23) 
1::34:, Nepal (4:8) 
Dobile Yirkpong's case is not unique. As the above tables indicate, this sad state 
of affairs is very much the reality in rural Ghana today. The state's macro-economic 
policies only seem to further impoverish people in these communities, making them 
objects of pity and creating the right atmosphere for NGO intervention. These are the 
places that are eventually expected to benefit from macro-economic growth. People in 
these communities have waited and hoped for these trickle down benefits for a long time 
now. Indeed, officials ofNGOs state that they are moved by pity to make a difference in 
the lives of people living in deprived communities such as Dobile Yirkpong. For 
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instance, the director of ProNet-North stated that his organization targets communities 
that do not ordinarily benefit from government support (ProNet-North, September, 2006). 
Clearly, these villages are impoverished and should have been the beneficiaries of 
poverty alleviation/reduction programs. As far as state policies are concerned, they are 
said to be the eventual beneficiaries of government programs. On the other hand, NGOs 
provide direct and immediate services to people in these communities. In both cases, the 
rural poor are at the end of decision-making processes. Clearly, NGO programs provide 
the cushioning that is needed to support these communities as they wait for macro-
economic policies to yield results. However, the supply of basic necessities to the rural 
poor is not guaranteed since NGOs are not under any obligation to provide these services. 
Even within the contexts of these short term solutions provided by NGOs, it is 
important to analyze how poverty is conceptualized by these service-providing good 
Samaritans and how decisions are made concerning the provision of these services to the 
rural poor. Some questions that arise in regards to this are whether or not communities 
are consulted about what they would prefer to have and why, or whether they are 
approached by NGOs with services because they visibly lack these services and should 
need them. 
NGO-participants in this study view poverty from a variety of perspectives. 
While ProNet-North looks at it from an opportunity point of view, Village Aid defines it 
in terms of powerlessness and looks at it from a political point of view. On the other 
hand, SL looks at the material aspect of it, seeing it basically as the inability of people to 
meet the basic needs of life. In Simli Aid's view, poverty is a human rights issue and 
should be tackled primarily as a human rights case. These definitions of poverty indicate 
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that while there are some underlying factors common to all, the orientation and approach 
to poverty differs greatly from one organization to the other. There is a general agreement 
among these NGOs that poor people lack basic necessities of life and that there is 
pervasive poverty. However, they have different theories and approaches for tackling it. 
Each of them justified their conception of poverty by providing laudable examples of 
why they looked at poverty the way they did. For instance, according to Village aid, 
"truly poor people are just modem day slaves, they have no power" (Village Aid, August, 
2006). They believe empowerment is the way to deal with it. ProNet-North thinks that 
providing poor people with opportunities to tum the circumstances of their lives around is 
the best way of dealing with the issue and actually empowering people. 
Simli Aid also believes in empowerment but adopts an educational approach to it. 
It is the position of Simli Aid that such empowerment will ensure social justice and 
guarantee equity in resource distribution and allocation. Finally, ISODEC adopts an 
advocacy approach making effective use of the media to 'name and shame' neo-liberal 
policies that violate people's basic rights to water and health care. A fundamental 
difference in the definition of poverty offered by the NDPC and these organizations is the 
emphasis on non-material aspects by the NGOs. While the general definitions share 
broad similarities, the approaches emphasized by the NGOs interviewed here vary greatly 
from that of the state and among themselves. This study fmds that both the funding 
source and mandate of NGOs determine their conception and approach to poverty 
alleviation. Do their approaches fall into a mainly distributive realm or are they providing 
transformative solutions? In this next section, I analyze economic redistributive 
approaches and recognition based approaches adopted by the state and NGOs in Ghana. 
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Economic Redistributive and Recognition-based Approaches to Poverty in Ghana 
Because material scarcity is the most visible aspect of poverty in Africa, the 
continent is presented in media discourses in a manner that not only appeals to sympathy 
and philanthropy, but also constructs victims of poverty as docile and desperate people in 
need of material resources only. In response to questions on funding for programs, the 
NGOs interviewed indicate that they receive funding from various international partner 
or funding NGOs and charities. Some generate funding on their own. However, self-
generated income is rarely, if ever, used for funding community projects. According to 
the executive director of ProNet-North, such funds are used for capacity building for the 
organization and not for programs in their beneficiary committees. In other instances, 
such incomes are counted as private/personal profit. Since Chapter Four is largely a 
discussion of NGO activities based on interview data, this section focuses more on state 
policies. 
The GPRS 19 and other state intervention policies for poverty alleviation in Ghana 
have been based on trickle-down neo-liberal policies. This is amply demonstrated in the 
2006 budget of Ghana, which places much emphasis on developing the private sector as 
an engine of growth for the country (Budget of Ghana, 2006). Such an approach is a 
direct response to conditions of foreign aid and international loan agreements from the 
IMF and World Banle 20 Since the issues of control and ownership over development 
policy is complicated, the situation can be likened to freeing a caged bird (freedom from 
debt is emphasized in HIP e) but restricting its access to areas determined by the 'freerer' 
of the bird. Therefore, the direction the bird flies is controlled and determined by the 
19 Details of the GPRS are discussed later in this chapter. 
20 See discussions of the content and focus of the PRSPs and their influence in domestic policy formulation 
in this chapter. 
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powerful other, but of course with the bird's consent. However the inability of the bird to 
fly to other areas is explained away as a problem of the bird's own making. In Ghana, 
large amounts of money in the form of loans and foreign aid are disbursed to the state to 
carry out developmental programs. However, donor policies, tied to aid grants and loans, 
still largely dictate how such money is spent. When these policies fail, bad governance 
and corruption are blamed for the failure. The government then takes the blame wholly 
for the failure of the programs. While internal factors such as bad governance and 
misappropriation of development funds indeed contribute to the failures of such policies 
(Ghana's Centre for Democratic Development, 2004), other factors such as the control 
and restriction of the freedom of the government equally play an important role in such a 
failure. Sachs (2005) argues that "the focus on corruption and governance is exaggerated, 
and seriously overstates the causal role of corruption and poor governance in Africa's 
laggard growth performance" (Ibid, p.312). This notwithstanding, the incidence of 
corruption, whether real or perceived, in developing countries casts doubts on the ability 
of these governments to put aid money to good use, hence justifying in a sense, the 
heavy-handedness of the IMP and World Bank (personal communication with officer of 
NDPC). However, there is a thin line between monitoring a country's fiscal prudence and 
controlling its development policies. In this context, blame cannot be placed at the 
doorsteps of the donors since the government willingly signs onto these programs. 
Bradshaw and Tshandu (1990) argue that African countries that benefit from 
development funds from IFIs are faced with two dilemmas: "adopt the constraints 
requested by international lenders, thereby decreasing wages, serVIces, and other 
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phenomena associated with their citizens' quality of life; or refuse to abide by these 
constraints, thereby risking a reduction in future loans from IFls" (p. 231). 
Government's participation in the process of developing the GPRS has been 
arguably constrained by its major 'development' partners or funders, the IMF and World 
Bank. Ghana's poverty reduction strategy is largely a reflection of the goals and ideals of 
the IMF and World Bank. However, arguing that the government of Ghana does not own 
the GPRS constitutes a denial of the government's agency in the preparation of the 
strategy. However, the true ownership of a document whose parameters were set before 
the strategy was even drafted is questionable. To this extent, I contend that the GPRS is a 
customized version of the IMF/WB's PRSPs. Government's agency then, is understood 
against the backdrop of certain external constrains that it has no true control over. At the 
same time these are not directly imposed on the government. In other words, what I am 
referring to as constraints may not be seen as constraints by the government since it 
willingly signs on to these policies. It is important to note that, ideologically, the sitting 
government in Ghana leans towards the right. It appears that there is some amount of 
ideological harmony between the IMF/WB's neo-liberal economic policies and the 
government's ideological leanings. However, this does not mean that the focus of the 
GPRS was not directly influenced by the WB and IMF's PRSPs. In fact, it must be noted 
that, in drawing up their policies, the IMF IWB do not consider the ideological leanings of 
any sitting or prospective Ghanaian government. In this case, the NPP's ideological 
leanings, perhaps, makes it easier for the government to justify its poverty alleviation 
strategies. 
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With the focus of the GPRS on macro-economic stabilization and development, 
social services are increasingly privatized and no longer seen entirely as a priority of the 
state. Generally, "the process of downgrading the social began with the ascendancy of 
neo-liberalism at the nation-state level in the late 1970s and globalization has carried the 
process forward by empowering and privileging neo-liberal economics as a transnational 
force beyond the control of nation states and governments" (Mishra, 1998, p. 485). A 
concentration of efforts at ensuring macro-economic stability, and even merely with the 
provision of basic social services alone does not guarantee a 'good life' for the poor since 
these do not necessarily constitute recognition especially for self-representation. 
Invariably, there's the need to take the non-economic factors of poverty into account, 
both at the local and international levels. Particularly for poor people, representation is 
crucial in the definition of a good life (Narayan, 2002). Representation is not possible 
without participation. Even if the means to poverty reduction is through the supply of 
economic resources, it is still very important that participation in decisions concerning 
economic supplies be incorporated into such policies. Ultimately, the inability of the 
government to exercise complete autonomy in the international arena is an indictment on 
the political rights of the citizens. This is because citizens elect their government only to 
have them report to the IMF and World Bank. 
State Poverty Alleviation Strategies in Perspective 
Ghana's history is replete with various poverty alleviation programs and strategies 
implemented by the state with support from donor agencies. Some of the donors, 
multilateral and bilateral, operating in Ghana include the African Development Bank, 
European Union, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), US Aid, the IMF 
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and World Bank (Whitfield, 2005). These development partners have been helping 
Ghana with resources to deal with poverty and have recorded successes in various 
sectors, especially water supply and provision of basic educational facilities and 
resources.21 Since Ghana has been preoccupied with development since independence, 
the IMF and World Bank have been her major 'development partners' offering both 
financial and technical advice to the state (Whitfield, 2005; Hutchful, 1996; Kraus, 1991). 
In 1983, Ghana implemented the IMF-initiated SAPs in a bid to boost economic growth 
and reduce poverty, in hopes of becoming economically self-dependent. Theoretically, 
SAPs were proposed by the IMF as antidotes to poverty and debt in developing countries. 
However, the neo-liberal focus of these programs required the state to cut down on social 
service spending, thus exacerbating poverty for the rural poor (Riddell, 1996; Bryceson, 
2004). In Ghana, "the introduction ofthe Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs 
of Adjustment (P AMSCAD) was a tacit admission of the failure of economic recovery 
and market reforms to improve the conditions of life of most Ghanaians" (Tettey et aI, 
2003, p. 1). Invariably, the manifestation of poverty as a largely rural phenomenon, and a 
situation characterized by the lack of essential social services in rural communities has 
persisted to this day. This is exemplified in the Dobile Yirkpong case. Even though the 
devastating social costs of SAPs were recognized by the Bretton-Woods institutions, they 
were dismissed as a temporary set-back that would be corrected once the country's 
economic situation improved (Watkins, 1995). Watkins argues that though there are no 
universal blueprints for successful implementation of economic recovery programs, 
institutional changes are necessary in ensuring that the world's poorest countries are rid 
of their debt problems (Ibid, p.l03). He further argues that if any economic policies 
21 This is evident from observations in many rural areas in Ghana. 
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proposed by the IMF and World Bank are to be successful in developing countries, then 
gove~nments of these countries should have the power to shape these policies themselves. 
Table 3: Poverty Rates 
Poverty Incidence 11 Extreme Poverty Rate 2/ 
Area 1991192 1998/99 1991192 
Accra 23.1 3.8 11.3 
Urban Coastal 28.3 24.2 14.2 
Urban Forest 25.8 18.2 12.9 
Urban 37.8 43.0 27.0 
Savannah 
Rural Coastal 52.5 45.2 32.8 
Rural Forest 61.5 38.0 45.9 
Rural 73.0 70.0 57.5 
Savannah 
All Ghana 51.7 39.5 36.5 
Source: Ghana Living Standards Survey; October 2000 
11P0verty line=US$363 
21P0verty line=US$283 
1998/99 
1.7 
14.3 
10.9 
27.1 
28.2 
21.1 
59.3 
26.8 
Table three above shows the incidence of poverty between 1991 and 1999. Even 
though this table indicates overall improvements in poverty levels in the country, 
extreme poverty increased in the urban and rural savannah areas of the country. The 
improvement recorded here is based on income-based measurements of poverty which 
addresses only the economic aspect of it. Several scholars have argued that poverty in 
many developing countries became worse following the implementation of the SAPs 
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(Riddell, 1996; Konadu-Agyemang, 2001). A report prepared by staff of the IMF/WB on 
Ghana's economic progress following the implementation of SAPs indicate that although 
Ghana made progress in the macro-economic sector, it suffered shocks in trade, which 
resulted in falling prices for its two main primary export products, gold and cocoa, 
thereby resulting in "a sharp deterioration in macro-economic performance ... " (IMF, June 
2001, p. 5). SAPs, arguably, worsened not only the debt situation of many developing 
countries, but also increased the dependency status of developing countries to the IMP 
and World Bank (Cheru, 1999). Furthermore, "many private banks will not loan money 
to Third World nations unless the IMF has 'approved' their domestic economic policies. 
Thus, African Countries cannot abandon agreements with the IMF and hope to receive 
loans from other sources" (Bradshaw and Tshandu, 1990, p. 231). 
Interestingly, governments in Ghana have emphasized agam and again that 
development and true poverty alleviation lies in wealth creation which is only feasible 
through the growth and involvement of the private sector.22 Developing the macro-
economic sector in Ghana has consequently involved sacrifices on the part of the poor 
who to this day are waiting and hoping to realize the benefits of macro-economic growth. 
For instance, the government responded to the worsening terms of trade in 2000 by 
"tightening monetary policy, postponing public expenditures and by raising VAT rate" 
(IMF, June 2001, p. 5). Also, "petroleum prices were doubled ... and similar increases in 
electricity and water tariffs took effect in May [2001] to curtail losses at those utilities" 
(IMF, June 2001, p. 6). The maintenance of the macro-economic sector inadvertently 
implies sacrifices for the poor. 
22 These statements are usually made through presidential addresses, or addresses by finance ministers. This 
is also evident in the budget statement of Ghana discussed a little later in this chapter. 
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The Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) and Ghana's Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS) 
In this section, I examine the Ripe initiative, in order to deconstruct some of the 
dominant assumptions about it and assess its potential to offer transformative solutions to 
poverty in Ghana. For example, what does it really mean to have a consultative process 
in drawing up a PRSP? It will be demonstrated that the PRSPs are in a lot of ways similar 
to the SAPs. Solutions presented through this approach, even with the potential for 
transformative solutions internally, still largely constitute an affIrmative solution 
internationally. 
The Ripe initiative is a joint IMFIWB debt relief initiative for developing 
countries deemed to have unsustainable debt levels. Under the initiative, portions of debt 
are cancelled for any country that is successful at implementing various policy conditions 
or performance criteria. Launched in 1996, the initiative has undergone some reviews and 
is now called the 'enhanced Ripe initiative' (IMF, 2005). According to the IMF, in order 
to qualify for Ripe, a country must "establish a track record of reform and sound 
policies through IMF and IDA-supported programs; and (4) have developed a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) through a broad-based participatory process" (IMF, 
2006, no page). Rowever, these alone do not guarantee membership to Ripe since the 
fInal decision rests with the executive boards of the IMF and World Ban1e These boards 
"formally decide on [the country's] eligibility for debt relief, and the international 
community commits to reducing debt to the agreed sustainability threshold" (IMF, 2006, 
no page). 
The process of qualifying for Ripe debt relief is complicated. For instance, even 
though the PRSPs required by the initiative are supposed to be prepared by the 
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beneficiary state, the focus and direction of these strategies are still shaped by the 
Bretton-Woods institutions irrespective of the participatory process emphasized in the 
initiative (Jones and Hardstaff, 2005). It is apparent that the consultative process 
involving the IMF and World Bank actually refers to a veto or approval process. For 
example, it is reported that Ghana's first interim poverty reduction strategy paper 
(GPRSl) was summarily rejected by the Bretton-Woods Institutions because apparently, 
it didn't meet the board's expectations (ISODEC, October, 2006). The PRSPs are thus 
rubber-stamped by receiving governments and although these are not directly imposed, 
the adoption of such policies cannot also be said to constitute actual ownership in the real 
sense of the word. Studies by Jones and Hardstaff (2005) on the participatory process of 
preparing the GPRS in Ghana show that the process of preparing the PRSP was known to 
lack parliamentary inputs, known to have problems with quality of citizen participation 
and direct donor imposition of policies (Gould and Ojanen, 2003). 
The above notwithstanding, the HIPC initiative has succeeded in canceling some 
of the debt owed by developing countries. For instance, the government of Sweden, under 
the HIPC program, cancelled US $14.5 million out of US $18.3 million of Ghana's debt 
owed to Sweden (Eurodad news article, 2005). The president of Ghana also reports that 
the G-8 has cancelled total debts owing to the tune of over US $8 billion (President of 
Ghana, October 2006). This should hopefully provide leverage for accelerated economic 
growth and development. 
Despite these 'success' stories, the policies of HIPC make it even more difficult 
for member countries to exercise agency since any departure from the conditions set out 
in the agreement will result in loss of bilateral aid and the implementation of even more 
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stringent and perhaps harmful conditions for new loan agreements (Oxfam, 2005). For 
example, the Fund and WB have on several occasions suspended financial support to 
Ghana for 'financial slippages' between 1992 and 1996 (IMF and WB, June 2001). Even 
though HIPC policies emphasize a lot of domestic economic restructuring in Ghana, 
these policies do not spell out mechanisms for restructuring the control mechanism of the 
Fund and Banle For instance, setting broad policy guidelines for beneficiary countries 
and insisting on strict adherence to conditions and performance criteria set by the 
WB/IMF do not give any indication of economic independence for developing countries 
like Ghana. According to the UN Millennium project, which was "commissioned by the 
United Nations Secretary-General in 2002 to develop a concrete action plan for the world 
to reverse the grinding poverty, hunger and disease affecting billions of people" (UNDP, 
2006, no page number), the current debt relief project still undermines the efforts of 
HIPCs to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the first of which is the 
eradication of extreme poverty. This is because many HIPCs still retain a substantial 
amount of debt to IFIs even after debt relief is granted under the RIPC initiative. Clearly, 
these policies have continued to sustain economic dependency on the IMF/WB. This is a 
clear indication that as Stewart and Wang (2003) contend, no real change has occurred in 
focus of IF!' s programs from previous structural adjustment programs. It can be deduced 
from this that these programs have been affirmative. 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) contain a summary of a country's 
developmental policies, outlining the macro-economic, structural and social programs the 
country wishes to pursue over a three year period. These are supposed to be prepared by 
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the country in a consultative manner with various stakeholders, domestic and foreign. 
These stakeholders include the IMF and World Bank. According to the IMF, PRSPs are 
prepared by governments in low-income countries through a participatory 
process involving domestic stakeholders and external development partners, 
including the IMF and the World Bank. A PRSP describes the macroeconomic, 
structural and social policies and programs that a country will pursue over 
several years to promote broad-based growth and reduce poverty, as well as 
external financing needs and the associated sources of financing (IMF, 2005, no 
page number). 
The stated objectives of this strategy as articulated by the IMF are laudable, especially 
since they indicate that "as a result of previous reviews and evaluations, the PRSP 
approach has been amended to allow countries greater flexibility to articulate and 
implement their strategies, and reduce the perception that the process is driven by the 
requirements of the IMF and the World Bank" (IMF, 2005, no page number). The fine 
print of the PRSPs gives the impression that the Bretton-Woods institutions have taken 
steps to ensure that developing countries have full ownership over the whole process of 
drawing up their economic adjustment programs or strategies. However, the consultative 
process involving the IMF /World Bank in itself contradicts the idea of recognition for 
ownership in this case. The IMF's influence over the 'country-driven' PRSP is evident in 
the process of approval and feedback from the IMF thus, "IMF and World Bank staff are 
to focus on providing candid feedback to countries on the PRSP ... and on linking more 
explicitly the lending operations of the IMF and the World Bank to the PRSP's own 
strategy and priorities" (lMF, 2005, no page number). Here, the heavy-handedness of the 
IMF and World Bank are still very clear. The recommendations of the Fund and Bank for 
macro-economic restructuring are in the GPRS. 
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The GPRS, according to the government of Ghana, is a 'comprehensive strategy' for 
growth and poverty reduction; the strategy outlines the following goals. 
Ensuring sound economic management for accelerated growth; 
Increasing production and promoting sustainable livelihoods; 
Direct support for human development and the provision of basic services 
Ensuring good governance and increased capacity of the public sector; and 
The active involvement of the private sector as the main engine of growth and 
art . . b 'ld' 23 P ner m natIon- U1 mg. 
Upon careful examination of theses goals, it is clear that the emphasis is on macro 
economic programs and an orientation towards neo-liberal economic policies as implied 
in points 1, and 4 above. The document goes on to state that, 'emphasis over the period 
will be on stabilizing the economy and laying the foundation for a sustainable, 
accelerated and job creating agro-based industrial growth' (GPRS, 2003, p. i). It also 
explains that this will eventually enable all Ghanaians irrespective of class to gain access 
to basic social services including health care, education, potable drinking water etc. From 
the document, it appears that the provision of basic social services is a secondary goal, 
with the government spending as little as 2.0% of budgetary allocation on health and 
2.8% on education. In terms of access to social services, the document vaguely states 
ways through which people's access to these services can be improved or achieved, 
without actually talking about concrete ways in which this can be achieved within the 
framework. For example, the document states: "consequently, the GPRS aims at 
removing key obstacles to access and utilization, by the poor, of basic education, health 
care, population control, good drinking water, and improved sanitation ... access to basic 
education will mean the rehabilitation of dilapidated public school buildings, provision of 
23 Quoted from the GPRS policy statement released by the government of Ghana (l9th February, 2003). 
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basic school materials etc" (GPRS, 2003, p.iv). This document is silent on the concrete 
measures on how these can be achieved. 
Clearly, the emphasis on domestic macro-economic policy as a way of ensuring 
poverty reduction in the GPRS is indicative of the fact that even this document does not 
seek to change institutional structures at the international level as far as the country's 
financially dependent status is concerned. For instance, it is the government's conviction 
that "the GDP needs to grow by more than 7% annually in order for real poverty 
reduction to take place" (GPRS, 2003, p.vii). In other words, the emphasis on the 
economic factors alone as a way of ensuring poverty alleviation is reductionistic because 
it implies that the achievement of high GDP in Ghana will ultimately lead to poverty 
reduction; this does not take into consideration the fact that achieving the desired GDP is 
tied to control of the international economy, which the country lacks. Secondly, the 
strategy aims at ensuring macro-economic stability in order to support poverty reduction. 
In the budget statement of Ghana for 2006, the finance minister states that " the main 
thrust of GPRS 2 will be to accelerate economic growth and poverty reduction by 
assisting the private sector to grow and generate employment" (Budget of Ghana, 2006, 
p. 18). In other words, the rural poor will have to wait for the macro economic situation 
of the country to improve before they can have adequate access to basic social services. 
As poor people, they are powerless to advocate otherwise, since the government's own 
dependent situation makes it powerless to advocate otherwise at the international level. 
The GPRS is strikingly similar to the SAPs because of the emphasis on macro-
economic performances. Even though Ghana, through the implementation of the SAPs 
recorded significant macro-economic gains, that did not directly translate into better 
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livelihoods for people (Tettey et aI, 2003; Konadu-Agyemang, 2001). In an assessment of 
Ghana's macro-economic performance by staff of the Fund and Bank in 200 I, Ghana was 
again praised for macro-economic gains sometimes made or sustained through increasing 
tariffs and rates on basic social services as indicated above. According to the assessment 
team, "Ghana has made progress on structural and macro-economic reforms since 1984, 
sustaining output growth and increasing private sector activity and investment over the 
last two decades" (IMF/WB, June 2001, p. 3). Arguably, then, although the GPRS, under 
the RIPC initiative has succeeded in achieving macro-economic gains, it is not clear that 
the living conditions of the poor have benefited from this achievement. In fact, in some 
instances, the poor have had to make sacrifices to sustain the performance of the macro-
economic sector. While indicating that "economic growth was the main factor that lifted 
households out of poverty" (IMF /WB, June 2001, p. 2-emphasis added), the assessment 
team also reports that "poverty actually rose substantially" in the northern sector of the 
country (ibid). Indeed it is interesting that households have been reported to be 'lifted out 
of poverty'! One plausible explanation for this disparity between macro-economic growth 
and improvement in social conditions is the lack of integration of social policy into 
macro-economic policies (Elson, 2000). In this case, redistribution and recognition are 
present, but not tackled in tandem. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the GPRS under the RIPC initiative, calls 
attention to the serious issues regarding the little autonomy that the state exercises in 
running the country, because of its close adherence to the policies of the IMF and World 
Bank as primary providers of development funds. Tettey et al (2003) argue that in Ghana, 
state institutions are 
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weakened by neo-liberal reforms and cutbacks, are functionally incapable of 
effectively administering its own economic reforms, institutional restructuring 
and grassroots participation in the political process. The result both undermines 
the legitimacy of the state and politics, and constrains the development of 
precisely the kind of strong and viable indigenous capitalist bourgeoisie that is 
supposed to be the agent of economic transformation in the neo-liberal model 
(p. 3, emphasis added). 
Indeed, through the letters of intent that Ghana summits to the IMF in requesting for 
assistance under the initiative, there is direct accountability to the IMF. This is because, 
in these letters of intent, the government reports what has been achieved with the loans 
and its ability or otherwise to adhere to the guidelines of macro-economic policies. Any 
'slippage' is explained in detail and a request made not to be 'punished' for the slippage. 
For instance, in the letter of intent for 2005, the government requested 'waivers for non-
observance of three quantitative and one structural performance criteria' (Ghana 
Government, Letter of Intent, 2005). 
Perhaps, the expectation that NGOs and Civil society will provide the needed 
services to rural communities while the government concentrates on macro-economic 
policies is what is holding the illusion firmly in place. This situation is captured by 
Clarke (1998) when he refers to Upoffs (1993) assertion that neo-liberals "see NGOs as 
part of the private sector, of socio-economic significance mainly, delivering services to 
the poor cheaply, equitably and efficiently" (quoted in Clarke, 1998, p. 40). This view 
holds true to a large extent, mainly because of the activities of NGOs especially in the 
recent past. However, the significance has moved beyond the realm of socio-economic 
provision of services to political activism through advocacy while still largely 
maintaining the earlier function of providing affordable social services. Also, 
there are spaces of resistance within the development NGO arena. Both NGOs 
and their clients are active subjects of the neo-liberal project, not simply 
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subjugated by hegemonic forces [but none-the-less overpowered somewhat by it]. 
Some employ a mixture of acquiescence, strategic subversion and resistance to 
achieve, in part, their goals and desires (Townsend et aI, 2004, p. 872). 
In addition to providing basic services to beneficiary communities, the NGOs that 
participated in this study are also involved in various advocacy programs, holding the 
government accountable for policies that have exacerbated poverty in the country. From 
the analyses, it is evident that though economic redistribution is important, it remains 
only an affirmative solution if systemic or policy defects related to poverty are not 
adequately addressed. This is clearly related to the economic conception of poverty from 
the point of view of the state and its main development partners. 
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Chapter Four: NGO and State Programs: Similarities, Divergence, Convergences 
and Creative Tensions. 
Findings from this study indicate that the approaches and strategies for poverty 
alleviation adopted by NGOs and the state share just as many similarities as they share 
dissimilarities. In this section, using the findings from the study, I examine various issues 
and challenges confronting both the state and NGOs in their poverty alleviation efforts. I 
begin by briefly stating the programs and initiatives of each of the NGOs interviewed. 
Issues of autonomy, dependency, powerlessness, and recognition are crucial to poverty 
alleviation strategies in Ghana. These challenges are manifested in various ways and 
negotiated differently by the two key players in this sector. The manner in which these 
issues are dealt with, to a large extent, impacts the lives of ordinary Ghanaians who are 
ultimately at the receiving end of the policies. 
NGO Programs and Initiatives in Ghana 
As indicated earlier, NGOs examined and interviewed for this study carry out a 
number of projects and initiatives in their beneficiary communities. Village Aid CINGO) 
funds projects on adult literacy in rural communities and also provides funding for small 
scale rural agricultural training. In terms of adult literacy, they focus on using drama to 
educate communities on the marginalization of women in their beneficiary communities. 
This technique is geared toward gender empowerment. In addition, the organization 
facilitates the construction of small dams; provides grinding mills and gives micro-credit 
loans to people interested in setting up small-scale businesses. It does this through a 
partner organization in Ghana. 
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Simli Aid is a local Ghanaian NGO which is a partner to Village Aid and operates 
mainly in the Northern Region of Ghana. Their programs are therefore similar. In fact, 
the programs and initiatives outlined above are actually planned, coordinated and carried 
out by Simli Aid with funding from Village Aid. Simli Aid seems to derive its mandate 
from Village Aid. It is important to note that even though Village Aid is the main funding 
partner for Simli Aid, Simli Aid also receives funding from other organizations and 
charities locally and internationally. 
ProNet-North primarily works III the water and sanitation sector in rural 
communities in the Upper West Region of Ghana. It provides potable drinking water to 
communities, organizes educational campaigns on good governance and political 
participation in communities to encourage people to be more assertive in demanding 
basic services and other rights from their local government representatives. In addition, 
the organization also supports girl-child education by providing items such as books, 
school uniforms and other stationary to girls enrolled in basic education. Additionally, it 
has formed local community-based committees to encourage girl-child education in its 
beneficiary communities. 
SL carries out a number of different projects for their beneficiary communities. 
They provide an international market for items such as baskets by advertising and selling 
them on the internet. They also provide micro-credit to people interested in starting small 
scale businesses. In addition, they donate bicycles to ease transportation problems of 
people in villages. As well, they donate vegetable seeds and financial support to basic 
schools for school gardens to help in the government's school feeding program for poor 
children in basic schools. This program is intended to serve as an incentive for poor 
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parents in the Northern and Upper East Regions of Ghana to send their wards to school 
since that takes the burden of feeding them off the parents. They also provide or build 
schools for local communities. 
ISODEC is mainly an advocacy based organization which operates nationally. It 
holds advocacy campaigns on various issues on poverty. In particular, its research and 
advocacy revolve around IMF/World Bank and government policies' inability to meet the 
basic needs of the poor and marginalized. In addition, it also provides water, school 
buildings and incentives to both students and schools, especially girl-children. 
Although all these organizations provide basic social services, sometimes 
including food to people in deprived communities, they all recognize and admitted, 
during interviews, that charity is no solution to poverty. They agree that in order for their 
efforts to yield the desired results, the state needs to corroborate their efforts and take up 
much of what they are providing to local communities. Although they are perceived as 
better alternatives to the government in terms of providing the needs of the poor, these 
service providers face similar challenges as the government. Ironically, some of the non-
economic issues of poverty they seek to eliminate from their beneficiary communities, 
such as vulnerability, marginalization, and lack of autonomy are the challenges that they 
face in their relationships with their various development partners. It is interesting that 
NGOs then seek to empower local communities with resources that they themselves lack! 
Autonomy and Dependency 
Relatively speaking, in comparison to the government of Ghana, the NGOs 
interviewed here seem to enjoy more autonomy from their funding partners than the state. 
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This is partially attributed to the fact that it is easier to 'punish' a defaulting state than an 
NGO.24 Even though there are checks and balances in place for NGOs from their funding 
partners, the level of monitoring is minimal compared to the monitoring mechanisms for 
the state. NGOs have multiple funding partners who do not operate under an umbrella 
organization such as the Bretton-Woods institutions (especially in relation to the MDBS). 
The issue of trust is important in such negotiations. NGOs seem to be trusted more with 
money and are therefore given a little more room for flexibility in their operations than 
the state. 
Furthermore, another significant difference in terms of funding related autonomy 
is that NGOs mainly get grants, while the state gets loans, with different terms and 
conditions. NGOs are also subject to various conditions from the different funding 
agencies that provide them with grants. The autonomy NGOs have, as well as the 
flexibility with which they implement their programs varies from 'partner' to partner. 
This is the case for the partners or funding agencies themselves who are also subject to 
terms and conditions from other funding partners (ProNet-North, September, 2006; 
Village Aid, August 2006). There are different tiers of authority and autonomy, 
depending on the source of the money. Autonomy and authority are passed on from one 
partner to the other ending with the receiving LNGO. For instance, according to an 
official of Village Aid, " ... we are funded by the government (of the UK) so we respond to 
their calls for program suggestions ... " (Village Aid, August, 2006). 
Moreover, the vulnerability ofNGOs and beneficiaries is generally increased as a 
result of financial dependency (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; ProNet-North, September 
24 This is because, state borrowing is coordinated by the Bretton-Woods institutions while NGOs source 
funds from any available source for their projects. 
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2006). Recountin g experiences of vulnerability with funding agencies, the executive 
director of ProNet-North indicates that, financial dependency is a big vulnerability for 
third world NGOs. A solution to this, according to him is getting the government to 
continue with projects they start as a security measure, so that: 
when the main donor funds dry up or for any reason they withdraw then you are 
sure that the [district] assembly, once they believe in that same cause, will apply 
resources to continue with that project (ProNet-North, September, 2006). 
Overall, Western donor organizations (intentionally or unintentionally) seem to be using 
the power of the purse to maintain their dominance by encouraging the dependency of 
LNGOs and governments of developing countries on their resources. Invariably, in the 
case of the government of Ghana, Hittle's (1992) assertion that "the World Bank is a 
body whose loans allow a country to go into debt in order to purchase developed country 
goods or developed country advice" (Hittle, 1992, p.l4), seem to have credence in this 
case. Having found themselves in bad financial crises, many developing countries 
including Ghana were desperate to improve their economic situations, however, the only 
way out was for further borrowing from the IFIs, as well as accessing IFI -funded 
initiatives such as HIPC. Consequently, since HIPC embodies policies that are similar to 
SAPs, it is predictable that the current HIPC initiative will only strengthen the 
dependency cycle or the continued reliance on IFIs for economic growth and progress. 
Similarly, NGOs create, andlor sustain a situation where their beneficiary 
communities are dependent on their services. Because many NGOs provide basic social 
services to communities, such as safe drinking water, health care and educational 
facilities, at little or no cost, rural communities have come to rely on the continual 
provision of these services from NGOs. In many instances, though helpful, these services 
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are provided in the 'hand-out' fashion to communities. The executive director of ProNet-
North captures this in an interview when he states that because of the reliability of their 
services, beneficiary communities have built a lot of confidence in them "but 
unfortunately. .. it also leads to dependency; I believe ... it is because of the long 
tradition of communities being at the receiving end of projects. This has been the 
problem whether from central government or from NGOs" (ProNet-North, September, 
2006). In other words, beneficiary communities are unable to sustain such programs. 
Furthermore, because NGOs have provided social support to many impoverished 
communities, many rural areas have come to rely heavily on NGOs as service providers 
instead of the government. By and large, as far as sustainability of projects is concerned, 
NGOs and the government of Ghana depend largely on external sources of funding. The 
majority of participants in this study indicated that their programs were largely dependent 
on external funding. As such, if such funding should cease, their projects will grind to a 
halt. 
Many NGOs have started income generating activities for themselves. In some 
instances, such funds are not used for community projects. This trend indicates that 
NGOs will soon become 'for profit organizations' and become part of the private sector. 
While the ability to be self-sufficient in income generation is beneficial in ensuring that 
NGO vulnerability is reduced, the situation may not prove too helpful to the rural poor 
who depend on benevolent services from NGOs. There is a thin line between financial 
autonomy on the part of NGOs and sustaining the benefactor-beneficiary relationship 
with rural communities. In other words, this relationship will change once NGOs become 
for profit organizations instead of non-profit organizations. As argued in the case of the 
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state, NGOs themselves need to assert their independence or autonomy in order to 
provide services that lead to autonomy for their communities. 
The above notwithstanding, ISODEC's experiences as a relatively more 
autonomous NGO sets it apart from the rest of the LNGOs interviewed for this study. 
According to an officer of ISODEC, the organization has been able to assert its autonomy 
over its projects irrespective of its reliance on external donor agencies. According to this 
officer, ISODEC has on occasion refused funding from funding partners that insisted on 
programs not compatible with its mandate. In this case, ISODEC is not as vulnerable as 
the other LNGOs and actually seems to be a little more independent in terms of its 
programs and advocacy. 
Powerlessness and Recognition 
Powerlessness and recognition play an important part in determining whether or 
not, strategies offered by the state or NGOs are transformative or affirmative. Taking the 
holistic definition of poverty into consideration, findings from this study suggest that as a 
poor country in need of development funding, Ghana depends on international 
development initiatives such as HIPC for poverty alleviation and development. Perhaps 
faced with few choices for funding, the government consciously signs onto preplanned 
neo-liberal economic policies. As indicated in my analyses of the GPRS, which is 
Ghana's version of the PRSPs for accessing funds under the HIPC initiative, even though 
policies in the PRSPs are 'customized and owned' by the government in the GPRS, the 
overall focus of the strategy still reflects policy prescriptions from the Bretton-Woods 
institutions. As a poor country, Ghana experiences many of the frustrations and 
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challenges that ordinary poor people experience. For instance, the poor are often unable 
to make choices on developmental programs affecting their lives therefore donors make , , 
developmental decisions on their behalf.25 Here, power relations come into play. This is 
because the lending or providing institutions are wealthier than the receiving 
communities. One speaks, and the other obeys. While this appears simple, the distinction 
between 'ruler and ruled' is complicated and the roles of the two can be confusing since 
the beneficiaries, in this case the ruled, can falsely assume the role of the ruler or appear 
to be in charge of the programs that are already preplanned for them. The selection 
criteria used by IFIs, Western donor INGOs and local NGOs, are strikingly similar and 
reinforce hierarchies between the rich and the poor. While the HIPC initiative is open to 
heavily indebted poor countries, NGOs tend to select poor and marginalized 
communities. For instance, Village Aid, selects "the very marginalized and the poorest" 
(Village Aid, August 2006). ProNet-North also talks about working with communities 
that would normally fall outside of mainstream government development agenda, the 
same with SL and Simli Aid. This difference between the beneficiary communities and 
donor organizations promotes the atmosphere where discourses of poverty not only affect 
intervention strategies but also affects the relationship between beneficiaries and 
benefactors. For instance, Village Aid sets out to 'empower rural poor women'. As an 
INGO, it is important to note that the idea for empowerment is already conceived in its 
definition of poverty, from its perspective, before these empowerment programs are 
25 It can be argued that the exercise of voting rights to elect representatives to government represents the 
ability of ordinary citizens to make these choices since their elected representatives at the level of 
government make the decisions on their behalf. However, the parliament of Ghana, which represents 
people from all areas of the country, is not only dominated by the MPs of the ruling party, but is also not in 
a position to engage in formulating policies. This is because its role is to "approve the legislative 
framework for policy reforms" (Whitfield, 2005, p. 648). 
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drawn. Such conceptions are clearly informed by a distant 'pitiful' observation of the 
Other, i.e. the poor rural Ghanaian woman. 
Generally, NGOs claim to incorporate the voices of the poor in the plan and 
implementation of their activities. Participants in the study stated that their organizations 
were people-centred because as one official indicated, 
poverty alleviation actually has a lot to do with the people. So we ensure that the 
beneficiaries are actually involved. They contribute much .... based on the 
decisions we make so whatever project they bring to us, we observe it technically 
and make our suggestions and recommendations to them and after that we work 
out a scheme at the end of it, they implement the project so the project is fully for 
them we serve just as a guide (SL, August, 2006). 
This notwithstanding, the level of representation and actual participation in decision-
making for local communities is still questionable because NGOs end up playing a 
monitoring role. This speaks volumes on how decisions and program choices for the poor 
are determined by the more powerful benefactor-organizations. As it is, beneficiaries are 
involved in contributing ideas to the planning of the programs; however, they are left out 
in the final decision-making process, but own the projects since they implement them. 
They are left with little or no choice but to go along with the suggested programs since 
that is usually the only alternative open to them. Again, this is strikingly similar to the 
type of ownership of the PRSPs encouraged by the World Bank and IMF in the HIPC 
initiative. Furthermore, some NGOs carry out preplanned programs in line with funders' 
policy requirements. In an attempt to counter this charge, SL indicated that research was 
first carried out before proposals were drawn. In further discussions, however, it became 
clear that even the component of participation was a donor requirement! In some 
instances, the decision to provide water is already taken even by virtue of the fact that 
some NGOs are interested in, and carry out specific projects. Consequently, in such 
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cases, the participation of the community is minimal, limited only to how the facility 
should be maintained and where it should be sited. This in itself is a complex situation 
because, sometimes what is considered necessary by some NGOs may not actually be 
seen as such by the communities for which these projects are intended. For instance, 
sometimes it is taken for granted that every community needs a health facility or water 
facility. This may not be the case for the beneficiary communities that may not see these 
projects as important, given their particular world view. In any case, communities hardly 
turn down offers for such projects since they tum out to be very cheap or even free. 
Although representation in NGO activity by rural folk is not as desirable as 
expected, the level of involvement is still commendable compared to the level of 
involvement of the state in policy decision-making at the international level. This, 
coupled with the transitory nature of governments in Ghana, has increased reliance on 
NGOs for the provision of social services. Many a time, programs started by previous 
governments are hardly continued by new governments, partially because of the different 
ideological leanings. Governments, then, appear to be temporary to people, while NGOs 
are for the most part seen as permanent. Moreover, NGOs mostly have no political 
motives for their activities, though their activities provide leverage for becoming 
consultants in their fields of operation. This is true for ProNet-North and ISODEC. 
Row is Ghana able to negotiate with her wealthy western counterparts or major 
IFIs such as the IMF and World Bank? Similarly, how are poor people in rural 
communities able to negotiate fairly with their benefactor NGOs? Ironically, the RIPC 
initiative targets poor developing countries, yet the actual programs implemented under 
the initiative tend to benefit people who are already well-off because of the macro-
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economic focus of these programs. There are also ideological issues embedded in the 
particular focus of these programs (Sachs, 2005; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001). As far as 
the HIPC initiative is concerned, prescriptions for neo-liberal economic policies appear to 
be a 'take it or leave it initiative'. Evidence of this is manifested in the requirement for 
qualification for HIPC funds (IMF Fact Sheet, 2005) which states among other things that 
"to receive the full and irrevocable reduction in debt available under the HIPC 
initiative ... the country must adopt and implement the PRSP for at least one year" (IMF 
Fact Sheet, 2005, no page). Since the Ghanaian government is encouraged to own the 
process, the government justifies the implementation of neo-liberal policies with a 
rhetoric of how this propels growth which will then eventually lead to poverty reduction. 
The above notwithstanding, it is important to note that macro-economic growth 
policies are necessary in the long run. The issue at stake here is that, government 
representation is necessary in such policy decisions at any level. At present, the Ghanaian 
government appears weak in pursuing its own policy agenda even if it falls in line with 
that of its lending partners. The presence of state agency cannot be denied in this process 
since the government is usually fully aware of the implications of going in for 
development assistance. While the argument that the Ghanaian government lacks 
alternatives in this area, is plausible to a large extent, advocacy oriented NGOs have 
argued that the government can always reject certain loans if the conditions are 
unfavourable to the overall developmental goals of the country (ISODEC, November 
2006). Evidence from this study supports the idea that government is constrained for 
alternatives and is aware of the restrictions on its agency involved in poverty alleviation 
initiatives offered by the 1M and World Bank. For instance, the 2006 budget statement of 
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Ghana indicates that "under the G-8 and multilateral debt relief, Ghana is to be forgiven 
an additional US $4.2 billion by July 2006. This leaves the country with a historic and an 
immense opportunity to pursue its national aspirations" (Ghana Government Budget, 
2006, p.3). This is almost a sigh of relief from years of both financial indebtedness and 
lack of autonomy. Even though macro-economic progress is said to have been achieved 
through the implementation of SAPs and GPRS 1, dependency on IFIs has not declined. 
The 2006 budget statement expresses this powerlessness as follows "GDP growth in sub-
Saharan Africa has been forecasted at 5.9% for 2006 from this year's figure of 5.4 %. If 
this is achieved, it will put the growth in sub-Saharan Africa back above 4.5% per annum 
for the first time in over a decade ... " (Ghana Government Budget, 2006, p.ll). The 'ifs' 
in the budget projections of economic growth do not sound promising for a bright future 
despite its macro-economic gains. ISODEC has indicated that the GPRS has not been 
able to sustain livelihoods and protect farmers from the vagaries of international trade 
liberalization policies. 
Voice and representation at the international level for poor countries is crucial to 
sustainable poverty alleviation programs. To alleviate or reduce poverty at the domestic 
level, it is important that other aspects of poverty be acknowledged and dealt with at the 
international level. I propose that it will be beneficial to have some form of a State 
Empowerment Strategy (SES) to compliment the PRSPs. While the PRSPs under the 
HIPC initiative are expected to reduce poverty domestically, the SES will address 
structural issues of inequality at the international level. One of the first issues to be 
addressed under the SES perhaps, should be how the IMF in particular can incorporate a 
human development aspect, which the World Bank professes as its mission, into its 
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policies. The SES will also address ways of respecting other developmental plans other 
than neo-liberalism in order to stem imperialism championed though neo-liberal policies 
by the Bretton-Woods institutions. Empowerment of developing countries such as Ghana 
will therefore be an important component of the SES. 
On the domestic front, NGOs are equally guilty of not adequately addressing 
recognition in their programs for their beneficiary communities. Compared to the IFls, 
NGOs have initiated steps to listen to, and incorporate voices of the poor in their policies 
and programs. While identifying that poor people and communities experience 
powerlessness, NGOs claim to adopt strategies that ensure participation by the poor. 
However, perhaps unintentionally, the way in which the programs are structured 
undermine the power and true empowerment of rural communities or the poor in their 
programs. For example, SL has a monitoring mechanism to ensure that "all loan 
beneficiaries are [doing well]; at least they, [monitoring officers], look at their 
performance to ensure they are doing well" (SL, August, 2006). As a micro-credit 
organization, SL provides start up capitals in the form of revolving loans to benefactors 
to ensure their 'development', however, " ... we monitor you, we give you all the 
necessary ideas, we provide real technical advise, we have the expertise ... and provide 
the technical advice" (SL, August, 2006). Here, provision of expert advice in some ways 
also constitutes a mechanism of control, which restricts the agency of the beneficiaries in 
such a loan scheme. Similarly, Village Aid views its literacy program as a tool of 
empowerment for adults in their beneficiary communities. After basic training in reading 
and writing, an official stated that, "the next thing we encourage them to think about is to 
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set up a small business or lots of small business, we offer-credit ... " (Village Aid, August, 
2006). 
The difference between this and the monitoring mechanisms of the IFIs is the 
scale and level at which it is done. Clearly then, in some ways the relationship between 
the government of Ghana and IFls is re-enacted in local communities by NGOs. 
'Encouraging' people to think about certain things also has significance in power 
relations between NGOs and beneficiaries as is the case in the relationship between the 
Ghanaian government and IFls. Such encouragement is furthered with incentives such as 
micro-credit to the people who take the 'encouragement' to set up small business. This 
becomes a subtle way of advancing a certain agenda as opposed to allowing people to 
could do with a loan. This is strikingly similar to the manner in which Ghana is 
'encouraged' to sign up for certain initiatives such as HIPC because of the promise of 
financial assistance. In the forward to the budget statement of 2006, the government 
asserts that "with great reluctance, Ghana accessed the HIPC initiative coupled with 
growth and poverty reduction strategy in 200]" (Ghana Government Budget, 2006, p.3). 
Accordingly, 
government, counting on the support of the people, has had to implement austere 
fiscal and monetary policies and bold economic reforms. This policy record has 
convinced our creditors to acknowledge the sacrifice of our young democracy and 
decide to forgive the nation about US$8 billion of debt accumulated over the 
years (Ghana Government Budget, 2006, p.3). 
Again, this is a clear indication that given a choice, the government may not have 
accessed funds under the initiative. 
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Human Rights Appeal in NGO Activity 
The study found that many NGOs used human rights as a basis for their advocacy 
because they consider poverty a human rights issue. Irrespective of their perspective on 
issues of development or even the focus or method of their programs, all NGOs in this 
study indicated in one way or the other that they considered themselves fighting for the 
rights of the poor to basic services. In particular, ISODEC uses the human rights 
framework in its advocacy. This NGO identifies the over-emphasis on civil and political 
rights in human rights discourse and are working at ensuring, economic, social and 
cultural rights especially for the rural poor. This they do by providing basic social 
services to the poor and also advocating for government's recognition of the need to 
provide and institutionalize the provision of essential services such as water. They also 
employ the human rights approach of 'naming and shaming' as a major methodology. 
Although this was not explicitly stated by the officer interviewed for this study, a look at 
their website and programs, especially in the media advocacy section, reveals that their 
ability to hold government responsible for violation of human rights ensures that the 
government pays attention to, and corrects certain mishaps in policy planning. For 
instance, ISODEC campaigned for the abolishing of user fees in the basic educational 
sector and succeeded in obtaining the capitation grant for school pupils. This grant 
provides each child in basic school with 30,000 Ghanaian cedis, the equivalent of about 
$4 (Ghana Government Website-Ministry of Education). In fact, ISODEC was able to 
persuade the government and the IMF to reconsider a water policy which according to 
them would have deprived a lot of people from getting any access to water. Overall, 
ISODEC uses 'human rights' as a concept to advocate for the provision of basic social 
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services. This they do by tagging the issues they address as rights, or rather, emphasizing 
the 'rights' aspects of these. For instance, according to the officer I interviewed, 
reproductive health is seen as a right and they are " ... now into family reproductive health 
as a right... and within that framework we are [advocating for] anti-retroviral drugs [as a 
right to HIV/AIDS patients]" (ISODEC, October, 2006). 
Generally, all interviewees stated in one way or another that they see poverty as a 
human rights issue. Interviewees indicated with passion that poverty was basically a 
violation of people's human rights. While there were no elaborate efforts to use the 
'human rights framework' in advocating for basic services, they used the concept in their 
advocacy campaigns. 
In conclusion, I found that the use of human rights appeals by NGOs was 
strengthened by the fact that, generally, there is a fear or shame of being accused of 
human rights violations, either as a direct or indirect or even unintended consequence of 
policy. This is more so for the government which cannot for political reasons be seen to 
be violating or denying the human rights of people under any circumstance at all. The 
particular methodology of naming and shaming, as employed by ISODEC also works 
very well in this regard. The mention of the term, 'human rights', is enough to get swift 
responses from the state and even the IMF and WB! Generally then, the human rights 
appeal saves NGOs the task of justifying the provision of essential basic social services to 
the poor. In relation to the literature on human rights, one realizes that human rights 
discourse has become a powerful force to reckon with. Thus, though scholars are still 
debating the justifiability of human rights (Mapulanga-Hulston, 2002; Eide et al, 1992; 
Roth, 2004), the term in itself seems to have taken on a life of its own, justifying both its 
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very existence and reasons for its recognition. Despite the fact that the human rights 
appeal is strong and has been used strategically to the advantage of the poor in Ghana, the 
moral appeal in it still stands out as worrisome since that reinforces the idea that we need 
to appeal to the kindness of people and institutions for a major issue such as poverty. If 
enough pity is evoked, then something is done about it, or if institutions will get 
condemnation from 'kind-hearted people' then, in order not to appear 'cruel' and 
insensitive, institutions or people then take measures to correct the situation. 
Irrespective of its weaknesses, perhaps the human rights appeal could be explored 
further to advocate for more transformative solutions to poverty in developing countries 
generally, and Ghana in particular. 
Shifting Focus of Poverty Alleviation Programs 
Some converging themes emerge in NGO conceptions of poverty. Essentially, 
NGOs identified the two broad components of poverty (material and non-material) with 
different emphasis on these aspects. Interestingly, all five NGOs see it from a rights 
perspective in one way or another. The study found that the manner in which poverty is 
perceived indeed plays a key role in determining the focus of poverty alleviation 
programs. Overtime, conceptions of poverty among participating NGOs have changed 
significantly, resulting in the change from direct intervention to advocacy activities or a 
combination of both. The changes in perception of solutions to the problem of poverty 
have resulted from their experiences (ISODEC, ProNet-North and Village Aid-
interviews). NGOs expanded their services to cover other areas that were not initially a 
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part of their mandate. It is unclear from this study whether these changes are tied to the 
changing notions of poverty by international funding organizations. 
One significant development in this sector is the introduction of advocacy as a 
major aspect of their campaign against poverty. In line with this, ProNet-North, Simli-
Aid and ISODEC have incorporated educational campaigning into their programs. They 
educate people about their rights to basic services and the need to strongly demand these 
from the state. According to executive officers of these NGOs, the government's primary 
responsibility is to ensure the welfare of Ghanaians. Therefore, people's basic human 
rights to services such as water, healthcare and food should be the unfailing responsibility 
of the state. Also, the executive director of ProNet-North admitted that in recent times, 
funding for NGOs has been limited especially with the introduction of the Multi-Donor 
Budgetary Support (MDBS) where donors no longer carry out their own projects but 
channel financial resources to the government for various projects. This, according to 
him, calls for civil society to be the watchdogs of government in order to ensure 
accountability from government. Since the MDBS has limited funding for NGOs, it is 
possible that their change in focus is a response to donor calls for good governance on the 
part of the state. In other words, donors are investing some money in campaigns to ensure 
good governance from government and NGOs are probably changing their focus to be 
able to tap into this new available source of funding. Advocacy is also seen as a tool of 
empowerment and provides the opportunity for self-representation. This is evident from 
the policy of Village Aid, where one official stated in an interview for this study that, 
" ... we've taken the stance that we want our African people, friends and partners to speak 
for themselves; we try and give them a voice in Europe" (Village Aid, August, 2006). 
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This gives credence to Clarke's (1998) assertion that NGOs have become "important 
political actors in the developing world" (p.37). 
This new level of engagement with and in the political process has seen gains in 
various areas. ISODEC has succeeded in influencing and changing various government 
policies. ISODEC has formed various coalitions to advocate for poor friendly policies 
from the state. For instance, the Centre for Budget Advocacy conducts research on 
budgetary issues and campaigns for equity in budgetary allocations. This centre also 
carries out educational campaigns to encourage people to monitor government in its 
implementation of financial policies. More significantly, ISODEC's free basic education 
campaign pressurized government to introduce the capitation grant program which has 
increased primary school enrollment from 3.7 million to about 4.3 million (ISODEC, 
2006). This campaign was premised on a constitutional provision for free universal basic 
education in the 1992 constitution of Ghana. However, the introduction of user fees for 
education constituted a barrier to this goal. As such, ISODEC campaigned for the 
abolishing of user fees and succeeded in obtaining the capitation grant. As well, advocacy 
has so far proven effective in reaching major goals in poverty alleviation in the world. 
Recent campaigns aimed at eradicating poverty have played a huge role in debt 
cancellation efforts by major power brokers of the world. However, such advocacy is still 
hinged on purely redistributive approaches. 
Furthermore, this shift may be a conscious effort by NGOs to pull away from 
communities and disengage with them as more and more NGOs gradually become 'for-
profit' organizations. This is still on the small scale, but interview data suggest that 
income generated by NGOs themselves is hardly used for poverty alleviation programs. 
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NGOs then, depend on benevolence to show benevolence to rural communities that they 
work in. This also suggests that goodwill is the only commodity that can be provided free 
of charge. State-funded programs while not free (since people pay taxes), would be more 
dependable in this regard. 
During interviews, there was a consensus that the state is interested in " ... visible 
schemes, infrastructural schemes, like good roads or something that actually can be seen 
to bring the country to the level that looks more European or American" (Village Aid, 
August, 2006). Also, as the executive director of ProNet-North puts it, "the government 
looks at the economic, the government looks at infrastructure, and the government 
doesn't look at the social" (ProNet-North, September, 2006). This observation was 
confirmed in part by the planning officer at the NDPC who spoke of the various 'obvious 
and visible benefits of HIPC funds' (personal communication). This preoccupation with 
visible structures serves a number of purposes: first, it provides evidence of government's 
use of donor funds, and helps political parties campaign effectively for office during 
elections.26 Political parties usually speak of 'development accomplishments' by pointing 
to visible structures. This in a way is also tied to the perception of corruption in the 
country. Since it is probably difficult for government to give evidence of qualitative 
human development activities and proof for example that 'x' amount of money went into 
organizing a council of elders meeting to think through developmental activities, the 
money is better spent actually providing a structure for which accounts are easily made. 
Huge posters and signs advertising HIPC projects are spotted on major roads in the 
country. What is important in these analyses is how such infrastructural schemes benefit 
the poor, the majority of whom are women. 
26 References are often made to development projects during campaigns for elections by political parties. 
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Gender Focus of Poverty Alleviation Programs 
Poverty in Ghana is clearly gendered, with a disproportionate number of females 
being poor as compared to their male counterparts (NDPC, 2005). Awumbila (2004) 
stresses that, 'poverty is experienced differently by men and women. As a result of their 
different opportunities, constraints, options and needs, women and men frequently have 
different priorities and are affected differently by many kinds of situations and 
development interventions' (p.10). She further affirms that women in Ghana experience 
greater poverty than their male counterparts due to 'limited opportunities, capabilities and 
empowerment in terms of access to and control over production resources including land 
and 'social capital assets such as participation at various levels, legal rights and 
protection' (ibid). This observation is corroborated by all interviewees in this study. They 
agreed that experiencing greater poverty consequently results in greater powerlessness 
and marginalization for women. Numerous studies rightly support the fact that women 
suffer more from poverty and bad economic policies than their male counterparts 
(Bezanson and Luxton, 2006; Elson, 1998; Awumbila, 2004). Analyzing the negative 
impact of SAPs on women, Jochnick (2006) asserts that "these policies have been 
particularly devastating to vulnerable sectors of the population such as the poor, women 
and children" (p.5). Similarly, Fall's (2006) study on the negative impacts of IFI's 
economic policies on women in Senegal and Sierra Leone reveals a lack of recognition of 
the status of women in these countries through insensitive economic programs. As she 
points out, "policy makers are not seriously concerned with the elimination of gender 
imbalances in access to and control over resources" (p. 2). 
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Discussing how indebtedness of African countries affects African women, Dube 
(1999) recounts a Swetswana myth in which a hen borrowed a needle from a hawk and 
lost it in the process of sewing. Refusing to accept the hen's apology for losing the 
needle, the hawk warns her that he would continue to eat her chicks until the needle is 
found. Since then, the cock has joined the hen in search of the needle but constantly looks 
up as in a plea to the hawk that the needle is lost. The hen has to this day continued to 
scratch with feet and peck with her beak in a desperate search for the needle since the 
hawk is still eating the chicks despite the cock's plea. Using this story, Dube explains that 
African men and women, despite their differences both face a higher enemy which flies 
high above them: their former colonizers. Dube contends that the African woman fights 
for "basic survival needs such as food and shelter to keep ... her family going" (Dube, 
1999, p. 2). 
In relation to this study, Dube's analyses can be broadened to include the 
following: first, the 'hawk' in this parable can be seen as referring to the IMF and World 
Bank. For example, through conditions placed on loans, the IMF continuously 'denies' 
social services to Ghana which is still 'pleading' as in the case of the cock, for debt 
forgiveness. On the other hand, Ghanaian women are engaged in activities that sustain 
life through their search for solutions to present problems. Secondly, dependency on 
donor financial institutions results in abuse, i.e., constant reminders of debt and threats to 
cut down on 'development funding' (similar to the hawk's threat of picking up chicks). 
As the government of Ghana, male-led and dominated, (exemplified by the cock) 
continues to concern itself with fulfilling debt conditions by actually cutting back on 
social services, women (hens) are left to perform 'magic' to fend for their families. 
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It is not out of place to argue that women in Ghana suffer the double agony of 
systemic oppression. Not only is their source of oppression from controlling donor 
countries, but from the government of the country because of the lack of clear 
institutionalized policies supporting their (women) development and emancipation within 
a profoundly patriarchal system (or the lack of enforcement of such policies where they 
exist). 
In response to this, NGOs in Ghana have broadened their programs to include 
special programs for women even if they did not start out with a clear gender focus. For 
instance, ProNet-North did not start out clearly with a gender focus, but ended up taking 
on gender issues because during their activities, they realized that many girl-children 
were not in school in their beneficiary communities. They therefore devised a strategy to 
encourage girl-child education through an incentive program which has been successful 
so far. Similarly, according to the program officer of SL, 
when we started our operations in the north,27 we realized that women basically 
do everything. They go to the farm, they go to the market, they work at home and 
we realized even though they work very hard they become poor because they 
sacrifice all their resources educating their children ... (SL, August, 2006). 
NGOs have made significant progress in this sector, with ProNet-North instituting girl-
child sponsorship programs, and ISODEC making a huge contribution to girl-child 
education through the implementation of their girl child scholarship program known as 
Girl Child Education Project (GCEP) which has provided educational scholarships from 
basic to tertiary education to over six-thousand (6000) girls presently (ISODEC, October, 
2006). As far as incorporating gender programs are concerned, NGOs are dynamic in 
27 Interviewee was referring to the northern sector of Ghana 
107 
quickly adapting to changing situations or at identifying problems as they observe them 
during implementation of other programs. 
SL now provides health services to women because they realized that poverty 
affects women's health more than men's health. This focus on poor women's health is 
also the focus of ISODEC's programs on gender poverty alleviation where they focus on 
women's reproductive health-again, seeing it from the human rights perspective-. Their 
advocacy for the supply of anti-retroviral drugs is expected to be more beneficial to 
women. 
This notwithstanding, this targeting of women in poverty alleviation programs 
unintentionally further marginalizes them since they are singled out as a needy special 
category that needs help. While this is in fact the case, care must be taken not to cast 
them as objects of pity. Their subjectivity should be acknowledged. It is imperative that 
these special programs be incorporated into mainstream planning and execution of 
poverty alleviation programs, not merely added (Elson, 1998). Indeed, a transformative 
solution is required for this. 
One significant issue observed during interviews, is the difference between male 
headed and female headed NGOs in terms oftheir approach to the gendered dimension of 
poverty in Ghana. I observed during interviews that all interviewees, with the exception 
of the only female interviewed, talked about poverty mainly in gender neutral terms. In 
their discussions, they referred to the case of women as a special category and only later 
on in their discussions. The official from Village Aid, started discussions from a 
gendered perspective and defined poverty in relation to powerlessness and 
marginalization of women. This was without prompting. She expressed a lot of empathy 
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for women in poor rural areas. For instance she states, "I think if you're really poor you 
have no chances in your life and you have no choice about how many children you 
have .. .! mean I talked to one lady in Ghana ... " (Village Aid, August, 2006). She goes on 
to recount a story of a woman from one of the villages in Ghana who had six children and 
wished that she would stop having children. It is important to note that this official 
acknowledged that "I don't know whether our whole organization will agree on this [her 
definition]" (Village Aid, August, 2006). This speaks volumes of the influence of people 
in decision-making positions on poverty alleviation policies. The focus of Village Aid on 
gender empowerment is an example in this case. 
What the study demonstrates quite clearly is that the manner in which poverty is 
conceptualized has a direct bearing on the policies and programs for its alleviation. 
Deducing from this, it is appropriate to posit that leadership affects programs for poverty 
alleviation in Ghana. Female-headed NGOs are more likely to pay more attention to the 
gendered dimension of poverty than male-headed organizations. With participants in this 
study acknowledging and designing programs in recognition of the special circumstances 
of women, it is clear that a conscious effort is at least made in recognizing women's 
disadvantaged positions. It is very likely that the recent injection of money into women's 
empowerment programs, by external donor organizations, in poor communities is the 
reason for the shifting focus to women by LNGOs. However, at the moment, with no 
strong evidence to support this, it is comforting to see the efforts that N GOs are making 
in addressing this issue. 
Even though it is undeniable that women empowerment is needed in poverty 
alleviation programs and the efforts ofNGOs are commendable in recognizing this need, 
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it is important to note that without cultural recognition and proper communicative ethics 
(Habermas, 1987; Butz, 1993) in the planning of these programs, these intended 
beneficiaries may in fact become victims of unintended imperialism from NGOs. Village 
Aid and Simli Aid's gender empowerment programs need to be critically evaluated for 
such cases of unintended consequences. 
The following story provides a clear example of the lack of recognition of 
difference in intervention strategies. A legend is told of a flood in the animal kingdom. 
Monkeys in the kingdom were quite unaffected by the flood. As they swung happily on 
treetops, they noticed fishes submerged in the water. Thinking that the fishes were 
trapped, the monkeys rushed down from their privileged positions (tree tops) to help the 
fishes. They lifted the fishes out of the water (their natural habitat) and placed them 
gently on dry ground. As the fishes, now gasping for breath wriggled about on dry land, 
the monkeys were quite pleased with their work of 'saving the poor fishes'. They 
misinterpreted the wriggling to mean dances for joy. In a few moments, however, the 
fishes dead, lay motionless. After a while, the monkeys got angry at the 'show of 
ingratitude' by the fishes and said among themselves 'look at those ungrateful fishes, not 
even a word of thanks for saving them,!28 
An analogy can be drawn between this story and some of the gender-development 
programs that some western NGOs implement to help Ghanaian rural women. In other 
words if value systems are imposed from outside without proper communication and 
negotiation, women may be worse off at the end of the process. The focus on individual 
women's liberation, perhaps instead of modeling that to fit into community dynamics has 
28 This story is an African Oral Tradition 
110 
the potential of breaking the social vitality (Butz, 1993) of these communities, leading to 
a breakdown also in political validity of women. 29 Since most of these women do not 
have any strong economic viability as interpreted by macro-economic experts, they rely 
on social support networks, and social capital for their livelihoods. The extended family 
has been a good cushion to most people, most especially women in times of difficulty. 
Food and medical bills are shared and the effects of poverty are seemingly less 
devastating. In a way, western feminist emphasis on individuation isolates and alienates 
the individual woman in all spheres of life. As demonstrated in the interview with the 
official from Village Aid, her show of empathy and pity for rural women may not have 
been understood in the context of the daily struggles these women face. The pity that her 
encounter with women from beneficiary communities evoked may have resulted from her 
lived experiences and world view which may not reflect the situation of these women. 
According to Butz (1993), Western development agencies sometimes fail to take 
the interconnectedness of the social structure into consideration in making decisions for 
interventions. I think it is usually the unintended consequences of some of these 
developmental projects that destroy the community (in this case, women) and not the 
intended consequences. Indeed through proper communicative action,30 shared meanings 
and understanding of issues would be arrived at by both development advocates and 
beneficiaries. Overall, it is important to note that even though poverty disadvantages 
women more than their male counterparts, poverty is not the root cause of gender 
29 This refers generally to social cohesion and social networks that give people a sense of self-determination 
and worth (David Butz, 1993). 
30 Used by Habermas, communicative action generally refers to a process of negotiation between policy 
makers/implementers and beneficiaries for shared meaning in order to avoid a colonization of the life world 
through the process of modernization. In other words, applied to social justice, Habermas advocates justice 
through a deontological process (locating justice in the process not outcome). 
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inequality and marginalization in many culturally patriarchal societies. In other words, 
gender friendly poverty alleviation programs may not necessarily lead to gender equity or 
stem women's subordination (Jackson, 1998). However, unfriendly gender poverty 
alleviation programs may exacerbate the situation. 
Internal Politics and Hindrances to Development and Poverty Alleviation 
It is worthy of mention that certain internal problems in developing countries 
constitute hindrances to successful poverty alleviation. These include civil wars, and 
cases of corruption and misappropriation of development funds. In Ghana, 
misappropriation of national financial resources can be blamed for the increasing 
impoverishment of people particularly in the northern sector of the country. This was 
acknowledged by interviewees. In personal communication with a planning officer of 
Ghana's NDPC, he alluded to the fact that stringent conditions and policies from IFIs on 
loans are not entirely misplaced in checking corruption among government officials 
(NDPC, Personal Communication, October 2006). Irrespective of the causes of these 
problems in developing countries, which no doubt requires critical examination, they 
have hindered the progress of many strategies aimed at improving the economic 
situations of these countries which in some way would have provided the leverage for 
recognition on the bigger world stage. 
Recently, the government of Ghana spent US$20 million3l for the 50th 
anniversary celebrations of Ghana's independence from British Colonial rule. This, in my 
opinion, is extravagance that is not only unnecessary, but consolidates the notion that 
Africans cannot handle development funds responsibly. This amount could be used at the 
31 Reported in Ghanaian news media 
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very least for debt servicing in a bid to free Ghana from debt and external control and 
dependency. This amount could also be channeled into more productive ventures to 
generate jobs and incomes for the rural poor. In fact, Ghana is currently experiencing 
severe electricity crises (Ghana web News Editorial, 2007). This has negatively affected 
the economy. Ironically, media reports on President Kuffuor's recent visit to the UK 
reports the president as saying that "failure of the west to help poor countries to fight 
poverty is enough justification for many youth to attempt to migrate to Europe, even at 
the cost of their lives" (Public Agenda, 19th March 2007). The president is also reported 
to have said that "their fight against corruption will backfire unless they help poor 
countries to improve the quality of life of their people" (Public Agenda, 19th March 
2007). 
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Conclusion: Hope for Sustainable Poverty Alleviation 
A story32 is told of an orange seller on the streets of a poor country who was 
barely able to make ends meet. On a particularly bad sales day, a very wealthy man 
walked up to this petty trader and inquired about the price of one orange. Realizing how 
cheap these oranges were, he got interested in finding out how the woman made ends 
meet at all. Out of pity, he offered to buy everything the trader had on sale and 
immediately counted money for clearing out the trader's stall. Surprisingly, the trader 
vehemently refused to sell all her wares. Asked why, she responded calmly "if I sell them 
all today, what will I do tomorrow?" Shocked, the rich man said "you can buy some more 
and expand your stall". Again the woman responded "what if another rich man doesn't 
come my way tomorrow?" The moral in this story can be applied to the situation that 
many poor people find themselves today. Money is important and in fact may be the only 
reason why many people work hard on their farms everyday. However, money does not 
give anybody a livelihood. Livelihoods rather give money to people. Livelihoods define 
identity to a certain degree and people derive a sense of meaning of life from engaging in 
familiar daily practices that give them a sense of achievement, accomplishment and 
control. In the story, one of the reasons why the orange seller refuses to let go of all her 
wares is because that will amount to a lack of control over her sales. 
The foregoing study has explored poverty alleviation programs in Ghana in order 
to find out what the nature and focus of these programs have been and why, despite 
various programs implemented for poverty alleviation/reduction in the country, the 
country still continues to experience poverty. My arguments are premised on the fact that 
there's a disconnect between what poverty alleviation programs are focused on and what 
32 This story is an African oral traditional parable 
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is actually needed to provide a transformative solution to the problem. In other words, the 
over-emphasis on the economic aspect of the problem, without adequate attention paid to 
issues of recognition, have resulted in a situation where poverty is not holistically 
tackled, creating a situation of dependency for many poor people and nations. This study 
has therefore looked at the ways in which these various programs have resulted in 
dependency both for Ghana as a sovereign state, and poor people in Ghana, by engaging 
in a comparative study and analyses of state implemented and NGO implemented 
programs and policies. Findings from the study reveal significant issues worth exploring 
in further research as well as point to the complex nature of poverty and poverty 
alleviation programs in Ghana. 
At the beginning of the study, I was highly critical of poverty alleviation 
programs by both state and NGOs. This research has, however, compelled me to 
reconsider some original arguments on the nature of these programs, seeing more hope in 
programs of NGOs, but none-the less still critical of how these programs provide only 
temporary relief to communities. This study has indicated clearly that the way forward 
for poverty alleviation is through politics in one way or another. I started by theorizing 
that NGOs were consistently de-politicizing poverty through their activities. This was 
found to be true to some extent. However, NGOs were also found to be actively involved 
in the political process, by being involved in advocacy and actually working in 
partnership with the government, and best of all, working vigorously to send poverty 
back to the political realm. 
This study also found the activities of NGOs in poverty alleviation crucial and 
inevitable to the development of the country. However, their programs, in one way or 
115 
another, are pre-planned. There also appears to be cases of pseUdo-participation by 
beneficiaries in their programs, more so for these organizations to satisfy donor requests 
for such participation or to use the little participation to advance their agendas. However, 
it is not clear if these issues are unintended consequences of well-intended actions. To 
this end, funds received from governments and major institutions particularly from the 
West need to be scrutinized for political and ideological underpinnings. Funds from well-
meaning individuals are probably stripped of any such ideological underpinnings. Further 
research on the actual motivation for the offer of assistance to developing countries 
would provide insights into whether or not there are political or ideological motivations 
for such support or if these simply arise from long periods of providing support. Donor-
fatigue or increased pressure on donors to provide funding could contribute to donors 
providing prescriptions on how to wean receiving institutions from them. For instance, 
Village Aid has "tried to engage with [their] partners on ways of income generating" 
(Village Aid, August, 2006). Such research will also critically examine how religious 
NGOs through programs and activities, promote their faith sometimes to the detriment of 
local beliefs and practices, disturbing the socio-cultural balance of the community. This is 
particularly important in the case of Africa, since many traditional beliefs hitherto were 
seen as antithetical to western style development. 
NGOs have become an important part of community life in Ghana because they 
constitute an important source of social capital for rural communities. By helping rural 
people with resources for their strategic daily survival needs, NGOs tend to localize 
solutions for poverty. To this extent, extensive research needs to be done on how 
localizing solutions for poverty affects chances for transformative solutions and 
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providing false hopes of development to rural communities. In addition, further research 
is needed on how rural communities can use the social capital provided by NGOs as a 
bridge for getting ahead, not just getting by (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000) as seems to 
be the case at present. 
In addition, further research is needed on how small developing countries such as 
Ghana, which are not strategically positioned to any major power, can assert themselves 
politically on the world stage and make their voices count despite their weakened 
economic and political positions. In the international political economy, power is seen to 
be vested in the resources that a country has or can dispense. Perhaps, an answer lies in 
regional networks such as ECOW AS, which may provide the lobbying strength for poor 
countries on the world stage, instead of relying on bilateral negotiation mechanisms. 
Perhaps, this is where the State Empowerment Strategy will be beneficial in providing the 
much needed space for such negotiations. 
It is evident from the study that for any transformative solution to poverty to be 
found, all programs and strategies need to incorporate fully, both economic redistribution 
and recognition. Moreover, poverty reduction or alleviation is about sustaining chosen 
livelihoods of people. To this extent, many NGOs operating in the country have 
identified the need to push for the institutionalization of their intervention policies and 
programs by advocating state involvement in areas that used to be their domain. 
Second, the study discovered that NGOs have evolved over time and become 
major stake holders in poverty alleviation debates in the country. Thus, contrary to the 
perception that NGOs merely localize and de-politicize poverty, this study found that 
NGOs in Ghana are actively involved in the political process in one way or another and 
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are fighting vehemently to re-orient poverty back to the domain of politics. NGOs have 
implemented programs aimed at drawing the attention of policy makers in governments 
to the effects of policies on the lives of the poor, particularly in deprived areas of the 
country. NGOs have thus become a strong force to contend with as far as advocacy is 
concerned. There are several success stories in this sector, the most outstanding being the 
ability of ISODEC to compel government to reconsider IMF/World Bank sanctioned cost 
sharing policy for water for rural communities. This organization has also been able to 
push for the implementation of the capitation grant for basic education in the country. As 
indicated by interviewees during the study, NGOs have become watchdogs over 
government policies. 
Furthermore, this study revealed that NGOs are changing the focus and direction 
of their services from direct intervention to advocacy. It is fairly safe to predict that in the 
very near future, most NGOs will completely shift focus to advocacy and research on 
social challenges confronting the country. Similarly, the study found that the rights 
appeal in poverty alleviation is used effectively by NGOs and has a very strong appeal. 
Perhaps, government can also make use of it in its dealings with the WB and IMF. The 
method of naming and shaming could also be effective in ensuring that governments 
provide economic, social and cultural rights to people. 
The above notwithstanding, NGOs, especially through their services also perhaps 
inadvertently encourage dependency on their services just like the IFls. This was 
admitted by interviewees in this study. It is clear that for NGOs to become a really 
powerful force both locally and internationally, there is the need for coalition building 
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within and between NGOs and the state. This has already been initiated by some NGOs 
for joint projects in the water and educational sectors. 
Overall, this study has unearthed some of the complex issues regarding poverty 
alleviation in Ghana. For instance, even though it is clear that the GPRS is heavily 
influenced by the IMF /World Bank, the government of Ghana presents and defends it as 
its own. While this could be an attempt to present the country as a truly politically 
independent state, it could also imply that the state has particular ideological leanings to 
the policies that IFIs articulate. In addition, poverty reduction33 could potentially be more 
transformative than poverty alleviation since the latter can be seen to imply temporary 
solutions to the problem. Poverty reduction on the other hand, appears to be focused on 
setting the stage for long lasting solutions to poverty in Ghana. 
This presents a complex case of the creative tensions between redistribution and 
recognition for bivalent categories (Fraser, 1995). Will redistribution not open up the way 
for recognition? Recognition, especially in this case, opens up space for economic 
redistribution. In order words, even if simplistically employed, recognition leads to 
policies for economic redistribution. Alternatively, redistributive policies already embed 
recognition. The mere fact that there are redistributive programs could imply that there is 
at least a recognition of a category or group that requires some attention. Perhaps then the 
complexities arise in the manner in which these redistributive programs are carried out. 
So if recognition precedes and generates redistribution, then, recognition of the fluid 
, 33 Note that throughout the study I use the terms poverty alleviation and poverty reduction interchangeably. 
This as explained earlier is partly due to their interchangeable use in policy documents and by interviewees 
who primarily see any distinction as a theoretical one. I have therefore treated the distinction of these two 
terms as theoretical but acknowledging and marking a difference between poverty alleviation/reduction and 
poverty eradication. In this particular section, I am engaging in a theoretical argument on the analytical 
distinction of these two terms. 
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nature or changing needs of the group involved needs to be constantly redefined. In other 
words, it ought to be a changing rather than stagnant issue. Or rather, the definition of 
recognition then evolves to include complex issues within recognition itself. In the light 
of this and the evidence from this case study, bivalent categories are seen to be 
interwoven through and within redistributive approaches. For instance, if transformative 
solutions can be found in redistributive programs, then is redistribution by itself not 
sufficient? In other words, going back to Fraser's (1995) theorizing, redistribution in this 
case embeds recognition if it offers a transformative solution. In this case study, poverty 
reduction programs carried out by the state, if taken in the context for providing 
infrastructure that will eventually provide the means for institutionalizing poverty 
alleviation in Ghana, are transformative in a sense. This transformative solution, 
however, simplistically assumes that no external influences and pressures act on the 
country's economic and political processes. The problem here is that, the international 
system does not undergo the corresponding change to complete the process. Here then, 
the argument for redistribution and recognition to be pursued in tandem will have 
everything to do with looking closely at the multi-tier segments of the programs or the 
players or power-brokers involved in any case of injustice. Here, an argument worth 
pursuing arises. If initiatives such as HIPe are set up at the international level, by the 
international community, for poverty alleviation, then there is, arguably, a component of 
recognition. However, such recognition has the potential to further marginalize the poor 
since it does not translate into actual recognizable political participation and self-
representation. I think that to a large degree, recognition is embedded in and derived from 
redistribution, however, it is important that such recognition translates into the ability of 
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the poor to participate actively, politically and socio-economically in decisions affecting 
their lives. 
Finally, findings from this study support the fact that policy makers seem to be 
paying more attention to economic redistribution than recognition. Given that 
redistribution is an important aspect of poverty alleviation, redistributive activities need 
to be transformative both locally and internationally. The means to the end is as 
important as the end product. Thus, the process of arriving even at redistributive 
approaches requires recognition to be effective. Such redistributive programs still need to 
go beyond 'diplomatic or pseudo representation' by actually incorporating the views of 
beneficiary states or communities. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
Interview Guide 
** Name and position with organization 
1. P II. Could you give me an overview of your organization? I.e. what is your 
purpose, mission, and a little bit of history of the organization. 
2. PI2.What services do you render to communities you are involved in? 
3. PI3.How do you decide on the communities? What basis/criteria are used in 
selecting communities as beneficiaries? 
4. PI4.What is your organization's conception of povertylhow does your 
organization define poverty? 
5. PI5.What approach does your organization take to poverty alleviation and 
why? 
6. What are your responses to government's poverty alleviation programs? 
7. Has the GPRS, in your experience been helpful to Ghana? 
8. PI6. How do you sustain your programs? 
9. PI6. Do you pay equal attention to economic and non-economic issues in 
designing your poverty alleviation programs? 
10. PI7. Is this approach the same as what the government takes? 
11. PI8. Does the state/Government provide the same services as you? 
12. P I9.Do you work in partnership with the government? 
13. P II O.How are you funded? 
14. PIl2.Does your funding dictate sustainability of programs? 
15. PIl3.Are your programs short-term or long term? 
16. PIl4.Are you a charitable organization? 
